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SUMMARY
This thesis discusses the value of medical futility as an action guide for neonatal end-
of-life decisions. The concept is contextualized within the narrative of medical
progress, the uncertainty of medical prognostication and the difficulty of just resource
allocation, within the unique African situation where children are worse off today
than they were at the beginning of the last century.
It is argued that the traditional medical paradigm, with its justification of an 'all out
war' against disease and death, in order to achieve utopia for all, is outdated. Death in
the neonatal intensive care unit is increasingly attributed to end-of-life decisions.
Futile treatment could be considered a waste of scarce resources, contradicting the
principle of nonmaleficence and justice, particularly in an African context.
The ongoing confidence in, and uncritical submission to the technological progress in
medicine is understood as a defence and coping mechanism against the backdrop of
the experience of life's fragility, suffering and the inevitability of death.
Such uncritical acceptance of the technological imperative could lead to a harmful
fallacy that cure is effected by prolonging life at all cost. What actually occurs,
instead, is the prolongation of the dying process, increasing suffering for all parties
involved.
The historical development of the concept of medical futility is discussed,
highlighting its applicability to the paradigmatic scenario of cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation. Particular attention is given to ways in which the concept could
endanger patient-autonomy by allowing physicians to make unilateral, paternalistic
decisions.
It is argued that the informative model of the patient-physician relationship, where the
physician's role is to disclose information in order for the patient to indicate her
preferences, ought to be replaced by a more adequate deliberative model, where both
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parties actively engage in an interactive deliberation for a plan of action. Both parties
ought to accept moral responsibility. Such a model of deliberation has the added
advantage of transcending the limitations of the participants to arrive at a higher-level
solution, which is considered more than just a consensus.
It has been argued that medical progress has obscured the basic need for human
compassion for the dying and for their loved ones. The literature furthermore reports
that the quality of end-of-life care is unsatisfactory for both patients and their
families. It is within this context that the concept of medical futility is positioned as a
useful action guide.
As we do not have the luxury of withdrawing from the responsibility to engage in the
deliberation of end-of-life decisions, such responsibility demands an increasing
awareness of ethical dilemmas and a model of medical training where
communication, conflict-resolution, inclusive history taking, with assessment of
patient values and preferences, is focussed on. The capacity for empathetic care has to
be emphasized as an integral part of such approach. Finally, in this thesis, the concept
of medical futility is tested and applied to clinical case scenarios.
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OPSOMMING
Hierdie tesis bespreek die waarde van mediese futiliteit as 'n maatstaf vir aksie in
gevalle van neonatale 'einde-van-lewe' besluite. Die konsep word gekontekstualiseer
binne die wêreldbeskouing van mediese vooruitgang, die onsekerheid van mediese
prognostikering en die probleme wat geassosieer IS met regverdige
hulpbrontoekenning; spesifiek binne die unieke Afrika-situasie.
Dit word aangevoer dat die tradisionele mediese paradigma, met regverdiging vir
voorkoming van siekte en dood ten alle koste, verouderd is. Sterftes in neonatale
intensiewe sorgeenhede word toenemend toegeskryf aan 'einde-van-lewe' besluite
Futiele behandeling sou dus beskou kon word as 'n vermorsing van skaars
hulpbronne, wat teenstrydig sou wees met die beginsels nie-skadelikheid ('non-
maleficence') en regverdigheid.
Die volgehoue vertroue in en onkritiese aanvaarding van aansprake op tegnologiese
vooruitgang lil geneeskunde, kan beskou word as verdediging- en
hanteringsmeganisme in die belewenis van lewenskwesbaarheid, lyding en die
onafwendbaarheid van die dood.
Sodanige onkritiese aanvaarding van die tegnologiese imperatief kan tot 'n
onverantwoordbare denkfout, naamlik dat genesing plaasvind deur verlenging van
lewe ten alle koste, lei. Wat hierteenoor eerder mag plaasvind, is 'n verlenging die
sterwensproses en, gepaard daarmee, toenemende lyding van all betrokke partye.
Die historiese ontwikkeling van die konsep van mediese futiliteit word bespreek met
klem op die toepaslikheid daarvan op die paradigmatiese situasie van kardio-
pulmonêre resussitasie. Spesifieke aandag word gegee aan maniere waarop die
konsep pasiënte se outonomie in gevaar stel, deur die betrokke medici die reg te gee
tot eensydige, paternalistiese besluitneming.
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Die argument is dan dat die informatiewe model, waar die verhouding tussen die
dokter en pasiënt gebasseer is op die beginsel dat die dokter inligting moet verskaf
aan die pasiënt sodat die pasiënt 'n ingeligte besluit kan neem, vervang moet word
met 'n meer toepaslike beraadslagende model, waar sowel die dokter as die pasiënt
aktief deelneem aan interaktiewe beraadslaging oor 'n aksieplan. Albei partye word
dan moreel verantwoordbaar. So 'n model van beraadslaging het die bykomende
voordeel dat dit die beperkings van die deelnemers kan transendeer. Sodoende word
'n hoër-vlak oplossing - iets meer as 'n blote consensus - te weeg gebring.
Die argument word ontwikkel dat mediese vooruitgang meelewing met die
sterwendes en hul geliefdes mag verberg. Verder dui die literatuur daarop dat die
kwaliteit van einde-van-lewe-sorg vir sowel die pasiënte as hul familie onaanvaarbaar
is. Dit is binne hierdie konteks dat die konsep van mediese futiliteit kan dien as 'n
maatstaf vir aksie.
Medici kan nie verantwoordelikheid vir deelname aan beraadslaging rondom einde-
van-lewe beluitneming vermy nie, en as sodanig vereis die situasie toenemende
bewustheid van sowel die etiese dilemmas as 'n mediese opleidingsmodel waann
kommunikasie, konflikhantering, omvattende geskiedenis-neming, met insluiting van
die pasient se waardes en voorkeure, beklemtoon word. Die kapasiteit vir empatiese
sorg moet weer eens beklemtoon word as 'n integrale deel van hierdie benadering.
Ten slotte, hierdie tesis poog om die konsep van mediese futiliteit te toets en toe te
pas op kliniese situasies.
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"As WEGROWOLDERTHEWORLDBECOMESTRANGER,THEPATTERNMORE
COMPLICATEDOFDEADANDLIVING."
T.S. ELLIOT,"EASTCOKER"
"THE PURPOSE OF MEDICINE IS TO DO AWAY WITH THE SUFFERING
OF THE SICK, TO LESSEN THE VIOLENCE OF DISEASE AND TO REFUSE
TO TREAT THOSE WHO ARE OVERMASTERED BY THEIR DISEASE."
HIPPOCRATES
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION
Birth and death are two poignant events that, in a unique way, converge in the
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) and represent two very significant human
experiences. With advances in medical knowledge and technology, more infants are
surviving and the death of the smallest and sickest has assumed increasing exposure
and controversy. The underlying motivation in medicine has always been the battle
against disease and death. It is the dream of modernity that through technical
innovation and technical control of nature, man could achieve utopia. Natural causes
of death have been banished and death has become 'preventable' in that death can be
postponed indefinitely, creating an illusion of immortality.
The imperative to eradicate human suffering totally has become a societal priority
against the backdrop of a narcissistic impulse to omnipotence (Richter, 1981: 129).
The absolute self-confidence of our technological era could be understood as a
defence mechanism against the experience of the fragility of life and as a mechanism
for coping with disability and the inevitability of having to die.
Where medical technology can neither cure, nor prevent suffering, nor buy time to
prolong meaningful life, as short as it may be, it is nevertheless able to postpone
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death - sometimes indefinitely- and sustain the orgamsm without improving the
underlying diseased condition in any way. A consequence of the latter is that the
boundary between life and death collapses. Medical therapy, keeping death at bay,
may actually increase human suffering. "Such a case of a hopelessly suffering patient
is only an extreme aspect of medical art, which - together with the power of the
institution of the hospital and supported by the law, creates situations where it
becomes questionable whether the rights (of the typically powerless and somehow
'imprisoned' patient) are respected or hurt ... " (Jonas, 1987: 244).1
In the fierce battle against disease and death, it is easy to lose perspective and to see
both as absolute enemies that need to be kept at bay at all costs. This medical warfare
comes at a very high financial and personal cost for all parties involved: patients,
parents, staff as well as broader society.
Avery (1998) as reflected in figure 1 (page 71), demonstrates the cost/burden-efficacy
relationship and that declining treatment efficacy is coupled with increased
costlburden (financial as well personal) leading to a marginal utility. On the one hand,
society has to apply stringent criteria for the allocation of limited resources. On the
other hand, patients are expecting increasingly high standards and innovative medical
therapy. Medical professionals are directly exposed to these convergent societal
demands, which create tension and can potentially clash with patient autonomy. It is
within this context that I will be arguing that medical futility could be a useful tool for
the critical analysis of marginal utility.
It is within the context of the above background that we need to understand that an
increased percentage of babies are dying after a decision is made to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining treatment. In the early seventies, 14% of deaths within an
American Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) followed the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment (Duff & Campbell, 1973). A decade later, that number was
1 My own translation from the German text: "Dieser Fall des hoffnungslos leidenden Patienten ist nur
das Extrem in einem Spectrum aertzlicher Kunst, welche - im Verein mit der Anstaltsmacht des
Krankenhauses und gestuetzt vom Gesetz - Situationen schafft, wo es fraglich wird, ob die
Eigenrechte des (typisch machtlosen und irgenwie "gefangenen") Patienten gewahrt oder verletzt
werden .... "
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increased to 20% to 50% (Whitelaw, 1986; Campbell, Lloyd, & Duffty, 1988) and in
the nineties, the percentage has again dramatically increased to over 80% (De Leeuw
et al., 1996; Kollée et al., 1999; Moskop, 1996). Staff and parents consider the
making of such life and death decisions as one of the most challenging and painful
experiences (Stinson & Stinson, 1983).
The question today is less about whether these babies- the very premature, the
congenitally malformed, or the severely damaged - can be saved than whether this
should be done, since the potentially adverse sequelae for these infants and for their
families are well known and widely reported (McHaffie & Fowlie, 1996: 2). The goal
of giving the infant a prospectively normal and healthy life, without pain and
suffering, can often not be achieved. It therefore should be permissible to stop
medical interventions in the hopelessly ill. The "hopelessly ill" may refer to " ... lives
that cannot be saved, that are irretrievably in the dying process .... " It may also refer
to lives " ... that can be saved and sustained but in a wretched, painful, or deformed
condition" (McCormick, 1974).
The case of Baby Doe could be paradigmatic for our discussion. In 1980, Baby Doe
was born as a Downs' syndrome baby with an oesophageal atresia, which could have
been repaired surgically. At the parents' request, nurses allowed Baby Doe to
starve/dehydrate to death over 15 days. This case prompted US federal law to
introduce the Child Abuse Amendments Act of 1984, which required anybody who
was aware of medical abuse to whistle blow. The federal statute mandated that states
" ... establish programs and procedures in child protection service systems to respond
to reports of medical neglect". Medical neglect was defined as "withholding of
medically indicated treatment from a disabled infant with a life-threatening
condition" (Hall, 1996: 408). 2
2 Further definition of MEDICAL NEGLECT: Failure to respond to the infant's life threatening
conditions by providing treatment (including appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication) which
in the treating physician's medical judgment, will be most likely to be effective in ameliorating or
correcting all such conditions (Child Abuse Amendments Act of 1984, cited in Hall, 1996).
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Personal professional experience in the NIeU has taught that seriously ill babies, with
a poor and uncertain prognosis, are often given the 'benefit of the doubt' and are
treated with all the possible technological options available, 'until Nature takes its
course.' Such approach suggests an illusionary belief to be able to avoid end-of-life
decision-making and an evasion of health professionals' responsibilities. It also blurs
the boundary between harm and the concepts of beneficence and non-maleficence,
where suddenly the well intended treatment - by using technology at all cost -
potentially creates exactly the opposite, namely inhuman suffering.
Within the debate of end-of-life decision-making, two main topics seem crucial and
cause heated debate. It is the polarity of sanctity of life versus quality of life and
medical futility. End-of-life decisions need a broad framework within which these
different aspects can be debated critically (see figure 2 on page 72). This essay will
mainly focus on the controversial and often misunderstood concept of medical futility
by concluding that it is a worthwhile tool.
The discussion of the concept of medical futility will have to be put within the
context of:
The autonomy - paternalism conflict
The grand narrative of medical progress
Modern uncertainty
Resource allocation and justice
1.1. THE AUTONOMY - PATERNALISM CONFLICT
Western debate of medical futility often takes place within a paradigm of conflict.
This is particularly true for the debate about patient autonomy versus physician or
expert paternalism.
Patient autonomy includes two essential conditions: "liberty (independence from
controlling influences) and agency (capacity for intentional action)" (Beauchamp &
13
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Childress, 1994: 121). Ethicists often confuse the role of paternalism through a
"failure to differentiate between a principle of beneficence that competes with a
principle of respect for autonomy and a principle of beneficence that incorporates the
patient's autonomy [in the sense that the patient's preferences help to determine what
counts as a medical benefit]" (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994: 272).
Paternalism nonetheless often involves some form of interference with or refusal to
conform to patients' preferences. "Paternalism, then, is the intentional overriding of
one person's known preferences or actions by another person, where the person who
overrides, justifies the action by the goal of benefiting or avoiding harm to the person
whose will is overridden" (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994: 27).
The Western World, predominantly English speaking countries and in particular the
USA, is celebrating the predilection of patient autonomy over physician paternalism.
As a result, it is understandable that the debate about medical futility causes anxieties
that the acceptance of autonomy over paternalism, which has been so laboriously
achieved, might progressively be turned upside down, allowing doctors to unilaterally
override patient preferences by using futility arguments. "[It] was an attempt to
convince society that physicians could use their clinical judgement or epidemiologic
[sic] skills to determine whether a particular treatment would be futile in a particular
clinical situation. The idea was that once such a determination had been made, the
physician should be allowed to withhold or withdraw the treatment, even over the
objections of a competent patient" (Helft, Siegler, & Lantos, 2000).
Within the broader African context and in particular, the South African context with
the history of Apartheid, there is an additional complexity where paternalism has
hardly been contested. Such a situation makes it easier for physicians to ignore and
neglect patient autonomy. Apart from the cultural divide and lack of exposure to each
other's value systems, there is an underlying assumption that medical knowledge and
technology could be too complex to understand for patients in general, and African
patients in particular. At the same time, patients could easily develop unrealistic
expectations from modem medicine, and adopt a cowed role trusting their doctors'
14
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expertise unconditionally. Itmay then occur that the physician accepts such allocated
trust into her authority uncritically. Consequently, end-of-life decisions are often
made on their behalf.
In South Africa, a traditional, conservative and religious environment could favour
such unreflective abuse of beneficial paternalistic authority.'
1.2. GRAND NARRATIVE OF MEDICAL PROGRESS
The utopian faith in modem technology is prevalent. Technology often imposes its
imperative to treat all infants aggressively (Guillernin & Hommstrom, 1986). The
faith in technology is grounded in the hope that through science we will find solutions
to all our problems and that we will finally succeed. "The grand narrative of the
modernist program assumed a logical and ordered universe whose laws could be
uncovered by science. As the knowledge of these laws accumulated, it could be used
to benefit humankind and eventually lead to the emancipation of humanity from
poverty, sickness, and class and political servitude" (Polkinghorne, 1992: 147).
Within this narrative of progress, the researcher becomes a " ... soldier in an army
where the battles are fraught with difficulty, dedication is valorous, but victory is
guaranteed. Each individual scientist makes his/her contribution - great or small - to
the annihilation of ignorance and the establishment of truth [often equated with
liberty and justice] for all" (Gergen, 1992: 25).
Technology however, has the tendency to be "... reductive, oversimplifying,'
impatient, and intolerant of ambiguity ..." (Cassell, 1993). It lures physicians into a
false sense of certainty, where "[t]he image on the film - with its implication of
objective certainty - comes to stand of the patient's back pain, to the point where
3 It would be worthwhile and interesting to analyse this imbalance of power in general and specifically
for the South African context, using Richter's concept of the God Complex. Richter explains
succinctly that such a complex was the result of a long process, which took place during the transition
from the Middle Ages to the Modem Era. He describes the change from being a powerless child but
within a secure relationship with God, to an attitude of autonomy, wanting to be in charge and
responsible for everything, while being in a world of uncertainty (Richter, 1981).
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greater weight is given to the image on the film than to the patient's pain" (Cassell,
1993).
1.3. MODERN UNCERTAINTY
The inherent reductionist tendency of technology has been exposed (Groeneweg,
Sidler et aI., 1991) and contrasted with uncertainty, which is increasingly accepted by
physicians as a central problem. Medical reality is complex, so that one can easily
find defects in physicians' personal knowledge as well as inadequacies in the
profession at large. Uncertainty is also related to the fact that every decision is about
the future, and the future is " ... ineluctably uncertain ... " and "" .. uncertainty can
never go away because all of science, medical science is about generalities" (Cassell,
1993).
Patients have the tendency to resolve their own uncertainties by trusting physicians.
This tendency increases the responsibility on the part of the physician. As a reaction
to uncertainty, a multidisciplinary approach, where each discipline is well aware of its
limitations, has developed. The dream of a complete and unifying theory of
everything has become as elusive as it ever was and will be.
There is a tendency to overcome the mentioned uncertainty by dogmatism and
applied rigid principles. These guiding principles become then absolute rules, i.e. that
death is 'absolute evil' and life is 'absolute good'. The created dichotomy can lead to
insensitivities when decisions about withdrawing or withholding of life-sustaining
therapies have to be made. The imperative of technology to be used at all cost could
contradict the four ethical principles of respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence,
beneficence and justice.
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1.4. RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS AND JUSTICE
Physicians generally shy away from economical arguments, but money spent on
patients who are dying is less well spent than money spent on patients who have a
chance to live and live well with a good quality of life. The main difficulty remains
the uncertainty to know in advance, who will survive and who will not, and how
quality of life should be assessed.
The discussion of justice and resource allocation within the South African context has
to be conducted within a broader socio-political situation of African people who are
still living in appalling conditions of poverty." Even in the first world countries,
increasing medical costs prove an ever-increasing financial burden, becoming
unaffordable even to the very rich.
Fleshman (2000) reports that the under-five year mortality rate for sub-Saharan
Africa in the year 2000 was one hundred and seventy five per thousand - more than
double the world average of eighty one per thousand and nearly thirty times higher
than that of children in developed countries. Equally disturbing is the fact that half of
the estimated five hundred and fifteen thousand women, who die annually from
pregnancy or childbirth, are African woman. Chronic malnutrition is prevalent, with
one in three Africans being malnourished. African children have the worst life
chances in the world and they were worse off at the end of the last decade than they
were at the beginning of it. Health services in particular have continuously
deteriorated and are now less effective then ten years ago.
"In 1990, the international community declared, 'together, our nations have the
means and the knowledge to protect the lives and to diminish enormously the
suffering of children.' Twelve years later it is clear that, in fundamental ways, world
leaders failed to deliver on their promises to improve the lives of Africa's children"
(Fleshman, 2000). It can therefore be argued that futile treatment, above all in the
4 Data released from the 1991 consensus demonstrates clearly the South African situation considering
poverty.
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developed as well as underdeveloped world (see marginal utility: figure 1 on page 71)
is a waste of scarce resources and could contravene the principle of justice.
Decisions will have to be made on the macro- and micro-allocation level usmg
standards appropriate for the African context. A note of caution should hint at the
possible reality, that many so called futile treatments could stimulate progress in
medicine and have a potential to become a tremendous resource in the future. Many
expensive, experimental and innovative medical techniques could in time have a spin
off. One such spin off could be that top specialists would stay in the public sector to
do research in their field of medical interest. For example, there could be an argument
for a worthwhile allocation of resources for a paediatric liver-transplantation
program, which would have, through accumulative experience and research,
beneficial spin-offs for other medical or even societal areas.'
Jacqueline Fortin (1990: 487, cited in Durand, 1999: 273) has asked how we ought to
apply justice within the distribution of health care and health-services, particularly in a
world, which, already for some time, has started to feel the burdens of advanced
healthcare and treatment options. Three main different approaches, namely
utilitarianism, libertarianism or egalitarianism have been described in answer to
Fortin's question. Durand (1999: 273-277) has expanded these three aspects to eight
different interpretations of the concept of justice, 6 which I will now discuss in some
detail.
1. Personal merit. To each person according to merit.
This theory highlights the importance of the individual and her performance. The
theory is mainly applied within the educational system, the competitive world of
sports and business. Being already a contested concept within its general application,
it becomes even more difficult to apply it to the medical system, since many medical
problems arise outside of one's individual control and are impossible to predict
(Fortin, 1990: 488, cited in Durand, 1999: 274). As examples of conditions without
5 The only South African paediatric liver-transplant program has recently been severely curtailed by
the only paediatric liver-transplant surgeon leaving the country to take up a Professorship in England.
6 The Belmont report proposes five and Beauchamp and Childress retain six (1994: 330).
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an individual contribution to it, we could mention handicapped newborns, patients
afflicted with a degenerative disease or patients involved in an accident. Such
examples could be contrasted with self-inflicted conditions, such as conditions caused
by abuse of tobacco, alcohol or drugs. A major difficulty, however, seems to be to
determine the weight of the patient's personal responsibility for the behaviour or
choices which have lead to these diseases (Durand, 1999: 274).
2. Social value. To eachperson accordingto contribution.
According to this perspective, civil servants, placed at the top of a social hierarchy,
functionaries of the army defending a country, artists contributing to a country's fame
and entrepreneurs running the economy successfully, would have a stronger right to
healthcare resources than the majority of unknown citizens of humble upbringings
(Fortin, 1990: 489, cited in Durand, 1999: 274). This concept would create grave
injustices, mainly against the underprivileged (the handicapped, the aged and others).
More importantly, the individual person's value would be reduced to her social role
or production capacity, and she will have value only as a means to an end and not as
an end in itself.
3. Thegreatestgoodfor the greatestnumber.
According to this well accepted and prevalent utilitarian concept, a just allocation of
resources would have to consider the distribution of the greatest good to the greatest
number of people. Resources ought to be distributed in such a way that the
community of citizens ought to get the greatest benefit possible. This approach
however, penalises the terminally sick, because the terminal stage of disease is the
least cost-effective (see figure 1: marginal utility).
Immediately, two potential injustices become apparent. On the one hand, developed
countries have justifiably been accused that they abuse world resources
disproportionately. According to Prof. S. Benatar (2002, personal communication),
the top 20% of people are using 82.7% of the world's resources, whereby the bottom
20% has to be satisfied with only 1.7%. Fifty percent of the world population live on
less than a dollar a day and use only ten dollars a year for healthcare, while
19
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Americans use on average more than $ 4000 a year. Eighty-nine percent of all the
money is spent on 16% of the world population who carry 7% of disease burden. At
the same time the Third World debt increases by 100 million dollars a year and South
Africa alone has to pay back 2,5 times as much on interest than what it spends on its
people's healthcare.
On the other hand, the same principle of injustice could be applied within a country
itself, where academic institutions are using disproportionately far more resources per
patient than hospitals do in the countryside. Further analysis could be undertaken
using the concept of fairness.
4. Respect free choice. To each person according tofree-market exchanges.
Everybody can freely choose what she wants to do with her property. The influence
of the state needs to be kept to a minimum. Everybody can decide what type of care
she wants by paying the necessary insurance costs. This understanding of justice risks
to leave out minorities, the unfavoured, in short the poor of society.
5. Priority to the most destitute. To each person according to need.
John Rawls (1971) argues that justice consists of the restoration of the injustices and
inequalities of one's fate. The role of the state would then be, according to this
understanding, to privilege the most destitute. Justice means then to establish equal
opportunities for all. It is then within this framework that we have to understand the
paradigm shift from academic medicine to primary healthcare which has and is taking
place in the present South African Healthcare System.
6. Fundamental needs. To each according to her needs.
According to this viewpoint, each ought to receive the resources she needs without
taking into consideration her contribution to society according to her capacity. This
conception of justice has the advantage to consider the fundamental equality of all
people by acknowledging at the same time the real inequality of people's needs. Since
human needs are without ends, they have to be restricted to the most fundamental and
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essential. Nevertheless, how do we define and determine, within the framework of
allocation of limited resources, what fundamental needs ought to be?
7. Equality of treatment. To each person an equal share.
The foundations of this conception of justice is that patients with similar disease
conditions ought to be treated equally and that nobody can consider herself as an
exception and have more rights than another. However consistent and widely
accepted this theory might be, it is not without its critique. Within the framework of
globalisation, no particular situation can be similar to another. Different regional or
geographic peculiarities have to be taken into account. At the same time, one would
have to ignore limited resources and for example make kidney dialysis equally
available for all those in need.
8. Reference to a chance event.
"Justice consists of a denial to choose amongst equal individuals and let rather have
chance a say, may it be through a system of lottery or adopting a rule such as first
come first served" (Fortin, 1990: 490, cite in Durand, 1999: 277). This is the case for
example with waiting lists (i.e. waiting list for liver-transplant). Such a conception of
justice is based on the equality and the fundamental dignity of everybody as well as
equal chances for all. Even though this interpretation of justice is sometimes
favoured, one could ask whether it is not just representing a specific way of evading
personal responsibility. The responsibility is shifted in this way from the physician in
the academic hospital to the referring doctor in the peripheral hospital who will have
to make the end-of-life decision because his patient has not been accepted into the
ICU. It is questionable, if the referring doctor, often junior and less experienced, has
the expertise to deal with such a complex situation.
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Chapter 2: THE CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL FUTILITY
No concept is without its historical antecedents. The question of the appropriate
means necessary to achieve a set treatment goal has been asked since ancient times. It
seemed inappropriate, even to Hippocrates, to treat terminally ill patients. He said that
there is "a time when we should stop treating those who are overmastered by their
disease process" (Hippocratic Corpus, 1977). Plato expressed similar concerns when
he said that a responsible physician "would not pander to those who should not be
treated even though they may be rich as Midas" (Halliday, 1997).7
2.1. ORDINARY AND EXTRAORDINARY MEANS
The Catholic Church took ethical discussions about adequate means in health care
seriously (Durand, 1999: 214). According to their doctrine, health is a fundamental
good, a gift of God, where everybody has a duty to promote it by using the necessary
means.
The Catholic Church argues that an ethical life demands those ordinary means that
are generally required for a normal course of life: nutrition, appropriate rest and
benign medical and surgical treatment that should not be excessively costly. To refuse
such ordinary means, according to this view, equals suicide and/or active euthanasia.
The notion of ordinary - extraordinary means has been popularised by Pope Pius XII
in 1957: "It [the duty to conserve life and health] generally demands to use ordinary
means (according to personal circumstances, place, time period and culture),
indicating means which don't impose any extraordinary burden for oneself or for
others." (Verspieren, 1987: 368, cited in Durand, 1999: 214).8
7Plato's critique is still as pertinent an issue today in the private sector, where financial motivations
may take precedence over beneficence.
8 My own translation of: "Mais il [le devoir de conserver la vie et la santé] n'oblige habituellement
qu'á l'emploi des moyens ordinaries (suivant les circonstances de personnes, de lieux, d'époque, de
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Extraordinary means are excessively costly, physically dehumanising, cause
unacceptable physical or psychological pain, and have an excessive risk without an
appreciable successful outcome. In this way, religious people do not believe that God
demands of them to use extraordinary means to sustain their lives, whereby secular
people arrived at the same conclusion by referring to the application of common
sense.
One could argue that what is extraordinary today could easily become ordinary
tomorrow. Examples of this process include the following: with the advent of
anaesthesia, a risky procedure, causing excessive pain and suffering, has become an
everyday procedure today. Furthermore, what is acceptable to one society might be
unacceptable to another."
A second example pertains to the use of antibiotics in an ordinary or extraordinary
manner. How do we know when the use of antibiotics is ordinary and when does it
become extraordinary? The prescription of antibiotics is customary and does not have
to be expensive. Is it therefore ethical to treat infected terminal patients with
antibiotics?
The terminology of ordinary and extra-ordinary means has always been unclear and
ambiguous. It was therefore, replaced by the terminology of proportional and
disproportional means.
culture), c 'est-á-dire des moyens qui n'imposent aucune charge extraordinaire pour soi-même ou pour
un autre."
9 Itmay be worthwhile to ponder the situation in Liberia today where trauma surgery has sometimes to
be performed without any anaesthetic.
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2.2. PROPORTIONAL AND DISPROPORTIONAL MEANS
The new terminology seems to reflect the contextual situation of patients better. The
debate around using proportional means seems to indicate that the specific situation
of a patient has been carefully analysed, in addition to all the costs and needs
involved for specialized care. Means used are thus carefully balanced against
projected outcomes. Again, the contribution of the Catholic authority was
considerable: "After all one would appreciate the means to be used by putting the
type of therapy used, its degree of complexity or risk, its costs, its possibilities of
application, into relation with the expected results, equally having taken account of
the patient's state of affairs and his physical and moral resources." (Verspieren, 1987:
420, cited in Durand, 1999: 215).10 Medical interventions are disproportional when
the expected outcome is beyond a balanced relationship, when the risk analysis
outweighs the benefit.
10 My own translation of: "De toute maniere, on appréciera les moyens en mettant en rapport le genre
de thérapeutique il utiliser, son degré de complexité ou de risque, son coïït, les possibilité de son
emploi, avec le résultat qu'on peut en attendre, compte tenu de l'état du malade et de ses resources
physiques et morales."
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Chapter 3: MEDICAL FUTILITY
Medical futility has increasingly replaced both above-mentioned concepts
(Schneiderman, Jecker, & Jonsen, 1990). The main motive for this change has been
an improved understanding of medical futility in terms of objectivity.
The term futility has its roots in the mythology of the Danaïdes (Jens, 1958: 14 & 30).
All 50 daughters of king Danaos were forced to marry Danaos' twin brother's,
Aegyptus, sons against their will. Danaos gave his daughters weapons and all, except
Hypermnestra, killed their husbands on the wedding night. As punishment, they had
to carry water in bottomless casks (futilis). The bottomless cask thus became a well-
known Greek image, symbolizing useless labour and, on a more general level,
indicating the apparent futility of all existence.
3.1. CARDIO-PULMONARY-RESUSCITATION (CPR) AS A
PARADIGMATIC CASE
The history of CPR could serve as an illustrative example of the current 'futility-
debate'. Bedell et al. (1983) enter this debate by reporting the inefficiency of CPR for
specific subgroups of patients (metastatic disease, acute stroke, sepsis, renal failure,
pneumonia and for those whose resuscitation took longer than thirty minutes).
CPR developed in the early 1960's within the coronary care units (CCU), where
highly trained personnel and monitoring equipment were concentrated within these
intensive care units (rCU) to monitor, otherwise healthy patients who had sustained
serious damage to their hearts. Bedell et al. (1983) have shown that in the event of a
fatal, in-hospital arrhythmia, CPR had a 50% success rate. Brody (1997) reported
similar success rates for patients suffering cardiac arrest or arrhythmia from drug
overdose or during anaesthesia.
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The success of CPR has lead to a typical and common development within medicine,
namely the uncritical and indiscriminate use of technology. I I This tendency seems
rather to indicate that physicians want to believe in the applied technology, than that
the technology used is actually effective.
CPR thus became a standard, knee jerk reaction to any patient who suffered a cardiac
arrest within or outside the hospital. The information that there were subpopulations
of patients in which the success rate of CPR was close to zero and therefore could
appropriately be labelled futile, was ignored (Brody, 1997). Moss (1989) added that
CPR was uniformly unsuccessful in the face of concomitant major organ system
failure, overwhelming sepsis and metastatic cancer.
There seems to be a strong psychological need for both physicians and the public in
general to overestimate the effectiveness of CPR (Wagg, Kinirons, & Stewart, 1995).
Medical drama on television, depicting CPR as being highly successful, might have
inadvertently influenced this general overestimation (Diem, Lantos, & Tulksy, 1996).
Recent data of the success of CPR paints quite a different and bleak picture. Basta et
al. (1998) report that CPR succeeds at a rate of 10 to 20% for in-hospital cardiac
arrest. This figure, however, decreases to fewer than 10% in patients over 65-years of
age and 3.5% in patients over 85-years of age. The success in out-of-hospital arrests
is even worse, however, with only 5% of patients able to be discharged home with
'intact' brain function. Elderly nursing home patients who suffer an out-of-hospital
arrest are reported to survive in only 1 to 2% of cases.
These statistics are neither widely appreciated, nor consistently implemented. It is
apparent that such knowledge could influence patients' expectations about their
liThe generalisation tendency in medical sciences, where effective technology in a particular context is
uncritically applied to other conditions (see for example the popularity of minimal invasive procedures
in the context of surgery), should be reflected on. There seems to be an inherent technological
imperative, which demands its uncritical application. The necessary and important concepts, such as
professional integrity, truth telling, and informed consent pertinent within this context are
acknowledged as demanding attention, but due to space limitations falls beyond the scope of this
assignment.
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outcome. When researchers shared outcome data with people, their stated desire for
CPR in a variety of medical scenarios decreased (Schonwetter et al., 1993).
It is difficult to generalize the predicted outcome of CPR in a heterogeneous group of
patients, who have varying underlying ages, disease processes, and general health
status. It is equally important to remember that such data cannot be directly
extrapolated to sick neonates, since their potential for recovery is often extraordinary
and unexpected.
In the very low-birth-weight infant (VLBW: birth weight < 1500g) many publications
have reported contradictory results concerning the success or futility of CPR. Lantos
et al. (1988, 1992) have claimed that survival after CPR for these babies was highly
unlikely, a finding which was supported by some (Sood, 1992; LeBlanc, 1988;
Willett, 1986) and countered by others (Korones, 1988; Richardson et al., 1988).
Therefore Meadow et al. (1995) tested the outcome of CPR of two categories of
babies, those who deteriorated from acute causes - defined as acute pneumothorax,
pneumopericardium, plugged endotracheal tube; and those who deteriorated due to
progressive causes - defined as everything else, but most commonly due to
progressive hemodynamic deterioration associated with multiple organ failure. The
first category had an acute new event in a sick child, which sometimes could be
attributed to the treatment itself (iatrogenic) and the second category suffered from a
progression of the underlying disease.
Their findings are intriguing and interesting. Seventy-four percent of 848 VLBW
infants admitted to the NICU survived to discharge from the hospital. Seventy-six
infants (9%) of all VLBW NICU admissions received CPR at some point after
admission. Forty-eight (63%) were successfully resuscitated. Only 17 (22%),
however, who received CPR could be discharged alive from the hospital. Eighty-six
percent of infants died within 3 days of CPR; in contrast, 11% of the infants who died
after CPR lived for three or more weeks before dying. Twenty-five (46%) required
CPR for acute reasons, compared to 29 (54%) who received CPR for a progressive
underlying cause.
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Twelve of the 25 infants who received CPR for an acute cause survived until
discharge from the hospital. In contrast, and this is interesting, none of the 29 infants
whose CPR need was due to a progressive underlying condition survived to discharge
from the hospital. In the authors' analysis " ... it did not matter whether [the infants]
were 400 or 1400g, whether they were 2 or 20 days old, whether or not they were
septic, whether or not they had congenital malformations, or any other diagnostic
distinctions that one might envision. If they received CPR without an "acute" cause,
their prognosis was assured" (Meadow, Katznelson, Rosen, & Lantos, 1995).
Despite evidence to the contrary, the current default condition is to provide standard
CPR for all infants. To criticize such attitude would expose oneself to severe
polarisation. The data, however, seems to show that CPR for infants, who deteriorate
from a progressive underlying disease, is unproven and should be labelled
experimental. It is therefore the physician's responsibility to argue, " ... why it should
be offered, paid for, and above all, consented to. Parents could refuse this
"experimental" therapy for any reason or for no reason at all" (Meadow et al., 1995).
The expanded analysis of CPR in adults and infants highlights another important
point, which needs to be emphasized here, namely that no hard scientific data stands
alone without its value judgement. The chosen threshold for a diagnostic test or for a
successful therapy inadvertently includes value-judgements. It is therefore imperative
to differentiate scientific fact from its contextual meaning and how and under what
conditions the new knowledge or technology ought to be applied.
Doctors need to be cautious and humble when they insist on their expert authority,
when they justify their decision-making on scientific data. Implicit value-judgements
need to be critically reflected on as an important aspect of such decision-making.
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3.2. DEFINITION OF MEDICAL FUTILITY
Most definitions of medical futility can be grouped into two main categories: the one
emphasizing quantitative aspects and the other qualitative aspects (Schneiderman &
Jecker, 1995; 1993; Schneiderman, Jecker, & Jonsen, 1990).
3.2.1. A QUANTITATIVE DEFINITION
The quantitative definition suggests that a treatment should be regarded as futile when
it has not worked once during the last hundred attempts (Schneiderman, Jecker, &
Jonsen, 1990). This is a purely quantitative account based on the probability that a
treatment will not have the desired effect: i.e. a probability established by the
empirical methods of medicine. Thus, if p is less than 0.01 (p=<O.OI), a treatment
option could be considered futile.
3.2.2. A QUALITATIVE DEFINITION
The qualitative definition of futility highlights the chasm between the achievement of
an expected goal of treatment and its benefit to the patient. A futile treatment in this
context is therefore one that "merely preserves permanent unconsciousness or that
fails to end total dependence on intensive medical care" (Schneiderman, Jecker, &
Jonsen, 1990).
Physicians should also differentiate between a therapeutic effect, i.e. limited to some
part of the patient's body (pure physiological definition of futility), and a benefit that
improves the condition of the patient as a whole, allowing him to appreciate the
outcome. Treatment with a therapeutic effect, but without benefit to a patient, is
burdensome and could be labelled futile.
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Some authors have endorsed the differentiation between quantitative and qualitative
aspects of medical futility and between effect and benefit of a treatment (Callahan,
1991; Halliday, 1997).
In summary, the ethical presupposition of the applied concept of quantitative and
qualitative futility is that futile means are not ethically required; with few exceptions,
they should not be provided. There is no obligation whatsoever for the medical
profession to offer futile treatment.
3.3. ANTIFUTILITY ARGUMENTS
3.3.1. AMBIGUITY OF MEDICAL FUTILITY
Even though medical futility has been increasingly applied as a decisive rule, several
ethicists reject it outright due to its inherent ambiguities.
Lo (1995: 73-81) argues for a moderate position based on a careful review of some of
the antifutility arguments. He believes that futility judgements could sometimes be
justified but that the concept is "... fraught with confusion, inconsistency, and
controversy" (Lo, 1995: 73). He grants that the concept of futility could make sense
in some instances, when the treatment has no patho-physiological rationale; 12 the
patient is not responding even though she is on maximal treatment; or the treatment
has already previously been given without success, and it is nearly certain that further
treatment will not achieve the goals for that patient.
He differentiates the above legitimate claim of futility judgements from other general
uses of futility, where the likelihood of success is very small but not zero i.e. where
the goals physicians perceive to be worthwhile cannot be achieved. In these cases, the
patient's quality of life is unacceptable, or the prospective benefit is not worth the
resources required.
12Here it would be interesting to review the ethics of complementary medicine.
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Drane et al. (1993) succinctly summarize what they regard as futile treatment for
babies. A treatment is futile when it "1 [sic] does not alter a person's persistent
vegetative state; 2 does not alter diseases or defects that make survival beyond
infancy impossible; 3 leaves permanently unrestored a patient's neurocardio-
respiratory capacity, the capacity for a relationship, or moral agency; or 4 will not
help free a patient from permanent dependency on total intensive care support."
Waisel et al. (1995) have argued that the quantitative futility definition could be
statistically interpreted to say that a therapy is futile when physicians are 95%
confident that it would be successful no more than three out of a hundred times. They
find this definition to be too loose and suggest a strict physiologic definition instead.
They suggest that a treatment should be regarded futile if it does not achieve its
physiological objective. If we apply this definition to CPR, it would imply that CPR
is futile if it fails to achieve a heartbeat and circulation. CPR would, however, not be
considered futile even if the patient consequently dies, if CPR achieved restoration of
circulation albeit for the shortest period or if the patient survives without a chance to
a quality of life.
They believe that their pure physiological definition is superior to Schneiderman's
(1990) differentiation between a qualitative and quantitative definition. They believe
that their definition avoids a value judgement. It is however physiologically
reductionistic, since it contains in itself a value judgement, which physicians ought to
find suspicious, namely that "when we administer therapy, we care only what
happens to the organs, and we do not care what happens to the patient" (Brody,
1997).13
Trotter (1999) argues that the concept of treatment failure needs to be seen in
conjunction with the belief about the good of life, because the good of life will affect
the choice of a futility threshold. "Thus conceptions of quantitative futility are not
divorced from conceptions of the good."
13 It is interesting that futility arguments are generally only applied to the initiation of CPR, completely
ignoring that it is equally relevant to its termination. Both events however include a value judgement
and are decisions, which doctors should never take lightly.
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When treatment becomes futile, remains an unanswered question and attempts at
quantification of treatment-outcome presents a difficulty. Our perception of futility
can range from a probability of success of zero to just being poor. Poor probability
needs to be defined first. Where should the cut-off point be? Should a treatment that
is successful only in 1 to 2%, be regarded as having a poor probability for success, or
should rather a probability of 13 to 15% be the benchmark? Who is going to be the
judge and pass the final verdict?
We can easily appreciate the relativity of the futility concept when we use a business
example as explanation. A business proposition with the probability of cashing in a
million dollars in one in every 1020 attempts should rightly be called relatively futile
when it is compared to another scheme where the probability is one in a 100.
However, if we cash in only ten cents with a probability of winning one in a 100
times, the money making enterprise could be equally called futile. This example
shows that the concept of futility can be evaluated from two different perspectives,
namely in terms of probability or in terms of quality of treatment outcome.
Personal circumstances, such as the level of poverty, amount of deposit required for
admission to the medical provider or the urgency of the need influence the judgement
of futility. Confusing the different levels of futility judgements often triggers endless,
insoluble disagreements between opposing parties.
Therefore, it is important that the concept of futility meets three conditions. Firstly,
there needs to be a treatment goal. Secondly, different treatment options should offer
a similar potential for recovery; and thirdly, there has to be some certainty that the
chosen treatment will fail. If these three criteria are met, then we could say that a
chosen treatment is futile considering a specific goal. The ethical literature is often
confusing because the differing arguments are not so much about the futility of a
treatment but about the morally inappropriateness of the treatment goals chosen (see
discussion of CPR: page 26 onwards) .
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The lack of information about the natural history of disease, which begins with its
biological onset and may have specific outcomes - such as intact survival, survival
with permanent disability, or death - is often lacking and attributes to the complexity
of this discussion of futility. Medical prognostication is uncertain and poses another
real problem for the futility debate.
What do we mean by prognosis and how do we arrive at it? For instance, surgery for
a patient with a poor prognosis, suffering from advanced, terminal cancer is futile,
whereas surgery for an inflamed appendix - amenable to excision and thus cure- is
not. "Prognosis is a probabilistic judgement - specifically, an estimation of the
relative probabilities that the patient will develop each of the alternative outcomes of
the natural history of the disease. Because a prognosis consists of probabilities, it
should not be made simply by informal recall of one's previous clinical experience of
similar cases. Rather, a prognosis should reflect a 'best estimate' derived from review
of all valid prognostic studies which are applicable to the patient" (Sinclair &
Torrance, 1995: 122).
Most currently available statistical models are not sufficiently accurate and
predictive, particularly when they are applied to individual patients. Furthermore,
existing predictive models do not seem to have improved accuracy of physicians'
clinical estimates of survival (Dotty & Walker, 2000).
In the context of such uncertainty, one's professional frustrationl4 with a patient's
clinical response to perceived indicated and adequate treatment, one's difficulty in
accepting the patient's outcome and quality of life could very easily be confused with
the scientific assessment of her probability to improve, and the consequential
labelling of such treatment as futile. Futility judgements could thus quite easily
become mistaken rationalisations and projections of feelings of professional
inadequacy, failure and guilt."
14 Often experienced as personal failure, leading to guilt feelings.
15 It could be a worthwhile endeavour to investigate such rationalisations further.
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3.3.2. IS FUTILITY A PHYSICIAN'S TRUMP CARD OVER PATIENT
AUTONOMY?
Antifutility arguments are often championed by ethicists who fear that physicians
may use futility arguments unilaterally, virtually turning the clock back to a time
when paternalism granted physicians unlimited power in making treatment decisions,
thereby severely restricting patients' autonomy through dominance of expert opinion.
Angell (1994) presents arguments, which seem to support such fears. She argues that
patients who are diagnosed with permanent loss of consciousness should be refused
medical treatment in order to prevent demoralized caregivers from being forced to
provide care, which they believe to be futile, and a waste of valuable resources. She
further suggests changing the definition of death to include a diagnosis of permanent
unconsciousness. According to her argument, treatment should be withdrawn
unilaterally after a mandatory yet limited period of medical treatment for unconscious
people, regardless of family objections.
The American Thoracic society seems to have embraced such a conclusion. They
show their agreement with Angell, by issuing a policy statement declaring that
treatment should be considered futile" ... if reasoning and experience indicate that the
intervention would be highly unlikely to result in a meaningful survival for the
patient", and assert that a " .... health care institution has the right to limit a life-
sustaining intervention without consent" (American Thoracic Society, 1991: 481).
3.4. BABYK: SANCTITYOF LIFE VERSUSFUTILITY
The history of baby K could be used as a paradigmatic demonstration of such a
futility debate.
Baby K was born in 1992 as an anencephalic (i.e. missing cerebral cortex with absent
higher brain function) infant girl to a deeply religious mother who insisted, against all
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protestations that everything should be done to keep the baby alive (Annas, 1994).
Subsequently, baby K was repeatedly admitted to hospital and ventilated for
respiratory failure.
Eventually the mother found everybody opposing her: the father, the doctors involved
in the case, the local Ethics Committee, the hospital administration, and the relevant
professional medical societies, namely the American Academy of Pediatrics and the
Society of Critical Care Medicine.
The mother hoped for a miracle, believing that God was to determine the time and
place of her child's death. The physicians argued that the child was without a cerebral
cortex, irreversibly in coma, incapable of self-awareness, and with a hopeless
prognosis.
The hospital administration, in its frustration at being compelled to grve 'non-
indicated' medical care, went to court and asked for permission to withdraw the
respiratory support, citing futility and the standards of medical care for anencephalic
infants as arguments supporting their position. The court ruled in favour of the mother
and ordered that ventilation should continue. The hospital appealed to a panel of three
judges of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which resulted in a split vote. Two
judges argued that respiratory failure was the relevant diagnosis, that it could be
treated, and that a respirator was effective therapy. The third judge held that
anencephaly was the fundamental diagnosis, that it was untreatable, and that the
standard of medical care for anencephaly did not include ventilator support. The
original decision was upheld.
This debate clearly illustrates the point under scrutiny, namely the unrecognised
difference in the treatment goal of the different parties. The matter was ultimately
sent for appeal to the US Supreme Court, which again upheld the judgement of the
lower courts.
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A number of authors, summarized by Stephen (1995), have commented on the
unlimited authority that this ruling seems to give to the demands of parents that may
be beyond the standards of medical practice and that the responsible physician ought
to oppose this.
Annas (1994: 1542) argues that physicians should act according to their professional
convictions instead of letting the courts decide. He says: " ... to avoid these scenarios,
physicians must work toward a third, in which they not only set standards for medical
practice, but also follow them. Physicians cannot expect parents, trial judges,
insurance companies, or government regulators to take practice standards more
seriously than they do themselves. If physicians cannot set standards for the care of
anencephalic infants and adhere to them, standard-setting by physicians is a dead
issue."
The controversy around baby K highlights another important concern, namely the
'no-person concept' (Trotter, 1999). There has to be a person to benefit from non-
futile treatment otherwise the treatment ought to be referred to as futile. The 'no-
person' concept presents however new controversies about what an acceptable
definition and understanding of personhood should constitute.
3.5. PERSONHOOD AND THE NO-PERSON CONCEPT
Engelhardt (1986) defines a person as an autonomous, self-conscious, rational and
moral being. He distinguishes such a person from a human being. He denies that
biological factors such as the human genome by themselves are enough to constitute a
person. Not all human beings are therefore automatically persons. "The foetus,
infants, the profoundly mentally retarded, and the hopelessly comatose provide
examples of human non-persons" (Engelhardt 1986: 107).
According to this definition, one could then suggest that two categories of human
beings exist within the broader human community, namely persons and non-persons;
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some are not yet, but have the potential to become persons; others are no longer
persons, after they have been such; and some will never be a person. According to
him, only persons have the right to unconditional respect. "The principle of autonomy
and its elaboration in the morality of mutual respect applies only to autonomous
beings. The morality of autonomy is the morality of persons. For this reason it is
nonsensical to speak of respecting the autonomy of foetuses, infants, or profoundly
retarded adults, who have never been rational" (Engelhardt, 1986: 108). The
implication of such an argument would be that society is not obliged to sustain the
life of non-persons at all cost.
Upon scrutiny, his thesis seems to be ambiguous. On the one hand, he tries to take
account of the facts, that there is a difference between a few day old foetus, an
anencephalic infant, a comatose patient and an autonomous and rational human being.
The strength of Engelhardt's doctrine is then that it keeps the unconditional care for
all human persons intact. On the other hand, his argument implies that lesser human
beings become dependent on the goodwill of the community of persons. Lesser
human beings become in this way dependant on the subjective (relative) value that is
attached to them by the community of persons. Objective criteria have vanished in
this way and the unity of all humanity is split into two different categories that seem
to demand different respect. His doctrine refuses to acknowledge biological criteria to
define personhood, and replaces them by psychological ones. Whether this is an
improvement remains an unanswered question.
Fletcher (1972, cited in Singer, 2001: 127, & 1974, cited in Durand, 1999: 373-374),
a Protestant theologian, argues similarly. He initially proposes fifteen indicators
defining a person, which he then consolidates to four: self-awareness, capacity to
interact, happiness and neocortical function. Finally, he retains a single decisive
criterion for personhood, namely neocortical function.
Some critical questions arise form Fletcher's position. Firstly, the coherence of his
indicators of personhood could be questioned. Are these listed criteria of equal
importance? Secondly, the character of some of the items listed is relative and
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subjective. For example, how should one appreciate or categorize happiness? Finally,
is it necessary to fix impossible boundaries at all costs?
Both above theories of personhood are reductionist. In their definition of a person, the
theory is centred on a specific criterion that is directly operational. It was Singer
(2002), who dared to apply the logic of these doctrines rationally and took it one-step
further to include higher developed animals, such as the great apes, into the
community of persons.
He (1995; 2001) argues, that beings with the mental capacity to see themselves as
existing over time, are persons. Killing them is therefore morally wrong. While all
normal adult human beings and some non-human animals, such as the great apes,
could be regarded according to Singer as persons; many animals and some human
beings, such as newborn infants and the severely brain-damaged, are not persons in a
moral sense. While their capacity to experience pain makes them morally
considerable, killing them painlessly cannot be considered directly wrong.
"The new vision leaves no room for the traditional answer to these questions [who is
a person?], that we human beings are a special creation, infinitely more precious, in
virtue of our humanity alone, than all other living things. In the light of our new
understanding of our place in the universe, we shall have to abandon that traditional
answer, and revise the boundaries of our ethics. One casualty of that revision will be
any ethic based on the idea that what really matters about beings is whether they are
human" (Singer, 1995: 183). This will have far-reaching implications, " ... not only
on our relations with nonhuman animals, but on the entire traditional sanctity of life
ethic.,,16 A thorough critique of the sanctity of life ethics has already been discussed
by Helga Kuhse (1987).
The conclusion can only be that physicians do not have to sustain a non-person
through all technical means available. Such medical attempt could be labelled futile,
even amoral. Not everybody will however accept above definitions of what
16 Italics inserted by me.
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constitutes a person and it seems that conflicts between patients, their families and
physicians are inevitable.
There are other more holistic interpretations of personhood such as the one by the
French philosopher, Lucien Seve (1994, cited in Durand, 1999: 375-381). Together
with the Consultative National Ethics Committee [Comité Consultatif National
d'Éthique = CCNE] in France, they seem to take a different approach from the
philosophers mentioned above. Instead of being reductionist and defining a person
according to a specific operational criterion, Seve aims at deploying all aspects of a
person (the biological individual, the psychosocial personality, and the subject of law
and particular of morals). In this way, he tries to show that these differing aspects fit
together to constitute a singular unity. Such a person is complex but unified,
autonomous and open to other persons, even to future generations at the same time.
Seve differentiates three dimensions (the biological individual, the psychosocial
personality, and the subject oflaw and in particular of morals) relevant to a person. In
the first instance, a person is a biological individual, an indivisible organic totality
that is more than its parts (genes, cells, synapses, etc). The person is an integrating
whole of all the multiple elements that each in itself has the tendency to conserve the
being. The biological individual is a unique singularity and at the same time, all the
elements of our species can be found in it. "We can therefore objectively recognize
that the individual is an irreducible identity, which is at once the same and different
from all human beings (i.e. genome and central nervous system)" (Seve, 1994: 26,
cited in Durand, 1999: 376).,,17
Secondly, he recognises that a person has a psychosocial personality that gives her a
specific identity of psycho-affective and social dimensions. Thirdly, he introduces the
concept of the subject, the subject of law but more fundamentally the ethical subject.
17 My own translation of: ''Nous devons done objectivement parlant reconnaitre ft l'individu une
irréductible identité, qui le fait d' emblée même et autre que chaque être humain (i.e. genome et
systéme nerveux centrale)."
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These three aspects of a person (biological individual, psychosocial personality and
juristic - ethical subject) are neither interchangeable nor juxtaposed; they are related
through a unity that is the person. In this way, the person transcends scientific facts,
(biological as well as psychological ones) to arrive at values. As valuable a critical
evaluation of Singer's conception of a person would be by applying Seve's more
holistic one, there is no space for it in this essay.
3.6. VALUE JUDGEMENTS
I have argued that physicians seem not to be able to evade the responsibility of
making value judgements, because of their role in diagnosing and prognosticating
disease. There is, however, the danger of mistaking value judgements for factual or
scientific expertise. It is essential that we become aware of two types of judgements,
both of which physicians regularly have to make.
Firstly, judgements based on true technical knowledge, in which physicians can
legitimately claim expertise; and secondly, value judgements where physicians have
the obligation to respect the wishes of the autonomous patient, her family, community
and society at large (Brody, 1997: 3).
With the above in mind one can appreciate that futility judgements can slide into what
Veatch (1973) described as " ... generalisation of expertise ... " where physicians
illegitimately claim authority over value judgements that patients should be allowed
to make themselves. Just employing the specific terminology of futility could cause a
physician to decide that a specific treatment is not 'medically indicated' and in this
way could mask the value judgement. "Futility determinations will inevitably involve
value judgements about: 1) whether low probability chances are worth taking; and 2)
whether certain lives are of a quality worth living" (Youngner, 1994).
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3.7. CONVERSATION VERSUS SILENCE
According to Katz (1984), we have been developing a specific conversation between
the patient and the doctor in the western world, whereby the patient is encouraged to
take a more active, informed position within the therapeutic decision-making process.
It appears that supporters of the futility concept replace this open conversation with
the patient with silence. They conclude that they can solve all the difficult questions
without discussing them with the patient or her family by relying solely on their
professional expertise. IS
It is important to acknowledge that all professional expertise contains value
judgements. For example, a report from the Mayo Clinic (1996: 513, cited in Smith,
2000: 129) has reported that many physicians' definition of futility" ... includes
interventions that might be considered medically reasonable." The report noted that
some of the doctors studied, wanted to refuse CPR even though the patient's chance
of survival was ten percent or greater. The potential for futility decisions to be based
on the physician's prejudice or bias was illustrated by the findings that "CPR was
more likely to be considered futile if the patient was not white."
3.8. PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY
It has been shown that in vital decisions the patient's autonomy and self-
determination should be respected. If, however, the physician in charge is determined
that his decision carries more weight than the patients' or patients family's, to what
principle could one apply to justify overriding the patient? Brody (1994) proposed
professional integrity as a relevant principle in this scenario. Professional integrity
can be regarded as a key principle, expressing the physician's commitment to a core
of moral standards. There are some general assumptions typically associated with
such physician integrity.
IS It would be worthwhile to review Richter's 'Gottes Komplex' here again.
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I would suggest that there are three fundamental principles underpinning the
conception of medical integrity. Firstly, the primacy of patient welfare that dates back
to ancient times. This involves dedication to serve the interests of the patient and
altruism that contributes to the trust that is central to the physician-patient
relationship. Neither market forces, nor societal and administrative pressures should
compromise this principle.
Secondly, there is the principle of patient autonomy, as discussed above. This
principle requires the physician to be honest with patients, empowering them to make
their own informed decisions.
An thirdly, there is the principle of social justice that can be interpreted as physicians
having to be committed to the task of eliminating discrimination within health care,
whether this is based on race, gender, socio-economic status, ethnicity, religion or any
other social category.
Besides these three fundamental principles other professional responsibilities and
commitments could be summarized under the following headings (Medical
Professionalism in the New Millennium, 2002):
1. Commitment to professional competence and excellence.
2. Commitment to honesty with patients.
3. Commitment to patient confidentiality.
4. Commitment to maintaining appropriate relations with patients.
5. Commitment to improving quality of care.
6. Commitment to improving access to care.
7. Commitment to ajust distribution of finite resources.
8. Commitment to scientific knowledge.
9. Commitment to maintaining trust by managing conflicts of interest.
10. Commitment to professional responsibilities.
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I suggest that two aspects of particular importance are to be considered here while
discussing the concept of medical integrity. Firstly, we need to consider that medical
integrity could be independent of patients' autonomy and their level of medical
understanding. So that it cannot be misunderstood to imply that if patients have
adequate knowledge that the doctor should necessarily comply with their demands,
i.e. an unnecessary operation, such as a routine infant circumcision or unnecessary
and potentially harmful medical treatment such as the demand to prescribe steroids
for a teenage body-builder. Instead, in addition to respect for patient autonomy, the
practitioner should subscribe to medical standards that are completely independent of
patients' preferences. Physicians, as a specific professional group should have a
legitimate determination of such standards. The final choice for a specific treatment
therefore, could be the result of an intensive dialogue between an informed patient
with her integer physician. Such a situation would allow room for a referral practice
of patients who choose to insist on a treatment that clashes with the physician's
position of true integrity.
Secondly, the professional credo should equally be independent of the physicians'
personal value system. One could illustrate this by imagining two physicians, one
religious and the other agnostic. Their value-systems could essentially be quite
different, even though both would adhere to the same professional standards of
medical practice. Therefore, it makes sense to speak of an inherent medical standard
of practice.
The ethical goals defining such a medical practice of integrity should include
promoting health and preventing disease; healing and curing disease, and relieving
suffering caused by disease symptoms and as well treatment options. If a treatment
can be reasonably predicted not to achieve any of these conditions, then no physician
should be forced to offer it, since such treatment requires her to act contrary to her
professional credo (Miller, 1995).
Physicians are obliged to adhere to high standards of competence. This is certified by
examinations by peers and more recently a continuing medical education programme.
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Employing treatment options that predictably will not have a positive outcome
deviates from that standard of competence.
Physicians are also obliged to represent standards of scientific knowledge to the
public in a truthful manner, claiming only what their treatment can hopefully deliver.
Reasonable people will conclude that if a physician offers a treatment, it must have a
significant chance of success, which is often called a therapeutic misconception.
Thus, physicians who employ such futile treatments contravene the professional
credo and could risk becoming quacks or frauds. Here one could again mention the
controversy of standard neonatal circumcision, particularly when it is propagated to
be performed without anaesthesia.
Physicians are only justified to risk harm to their patients when the possible benefits
strongly outweigh the risks such as in treatable cancer. If there is virtually no
objective benefit, then there can be no justification to put patients at risk of harm. To
demand futile treatment could thus force physicians to become agents of harm and
would contravene the professional credo as discussed above.
The above-mentioned case history of Baby K is a good illustration of the important
points discussed about professional integrity. A physician should not have to serve a
particular goal if it is antithetical to the medical standards that have developed and
been approved by the greater medical community (GMC). Therefore, no physician
should be forced to apply demanded, but futile treatment to achieve dubious goals.
What do we mean by GMC and what does it represent? In my opinion, it should
consist of all physicians who have contributed during their professional life to enrich
medical practice. It is a dynamic community who is constantly striving to improve
diagnostic and therapeutic skills as well as reflecting on the broader medical goal and
appropriate professional and moral behaviour.
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3.9. PATIENT INTEGRITY AND THE ABUSIVE
CHARACTER OF FUTILE TREATMENT
In a similar metaphorical sense, the concept of patient integrity, sustained by a
general community of persons, should be emphasized. No patient should have to
endure treatment, which would contradict her life values and no physician ought to
invade a patient's privacy and break her integrity with over-zealous, aggressive,
inhumane, abusive or futile treatment.
"Karen Quinlan represents one of America's most famous cases of medical ethics"
(Gregory & Pence, 1990: 3). She is a paradigmatical case for the above argument and
represents " ... a larger-than-life symbol of tragic dying." After she had fallen into an
irreversible coma, her adoptive family reached the conviction that the respiratory
support should be withdrawn. After an exhausting legal battle, Karen was transferred
to a nursing home, where she was maintained for more than a decade to die from
pneumonia on June 13, 1986.
Karen's story highlights the challenges of resolving conflicting standards of morality
within the health care system. Her treating physicians argued from a catholic position
of sanctity of life and opposed the wish of the parents to withdraw the respirator. The
Quinlan family argued that their adoptive daughter had already died and that there
was no prospect of improvement of a poor quality of life and that their daughter, who
used to be an active, outgoing young adult, would not have wanted to be kept alive in
the condition she was at that point.
In addition, the legal perspective and implications affecting the resolution of a moral
conflict as demonstrated in the Quinlan case, have to be considered. This however, is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
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3.10. THE NEED FOR A DELIBERATIVE MODEL
Metaphorically the futility debate could be likened to the 'sword of Damocles
hanging over our heads. When Damocles offered Dionysus all good things in life,
Dionysus looked up from the enticing and richly decorated table to see a sword
hanging on a string of horsehair over his head. He pleaded with God to have him
released (Jens, 1958: 29). The physician-patient relationship has frequently been
described as an often-conflicting power-dichotomy. Such polarity seems nevertheless
unnecessary and undesirable.
An extreme interpretation of patient autonomy has been to deny any room for
physician decision-making (Lelie & Verweij, 2003). Such an extreme approach has
often been called the 'informative or engineering model' of the patient-physician
relationship, where the " ... physician's role is to disclose factual information about
diagnosis, prognosis, treatment options, etc. A patient's role, on the other hand, is to
inform his or her physician about values and preferences concerning treatment." The
assumption here seems to be that all value-judgements should be the patient's
responsibility (Bosk, 1992).
Such assumption becomes illusionary, since value-free information is impossible to
attain (Veatch & Stempsey, 1995; Veatch, 1972). More importantly, the informative
model impoverishes the patient-physician relationship. Firstly, it discourages doctors
from empathizing with their patients as an empathetic attitude is undesirable and
negatively influences the doctor's professional attitude.19 Secondly, it stops from the
beginning any discussion between the patient and doctor, preventing doctors from
questioning perceived strange and irrational patient treatment-demands and
preferences. Thirdly, it prohibits physicians from sharing their acquired personal
expenences and moral beliefs. Fourthly, it completely misinterprets patients'
preferences as ready-made and given. It does not acknowledge or allow patient
preferences to develop or to be adjusted during the course of illness and therapy.
Fifthly, it deals with the patient-doctor relationship, the respective preferences and
191t is important to mention, that this is still a favoured attitude taught at medical schools worldwide.
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attitudes as if there is no overall, encompassing societal good to be considered. It
completely ignores that both patient and doctor have their preferences imprinted by
society and need them to be adjusted from time to time by the overall good of society.
Paternalism as the opposite of the informative model has been already debated. Both
models are inadequate for addressing the complex clinical problems and therefore are
undesirable.
Lelie et al. (2003) suggest that the dichotomy be abandoned altogether to favour a
model of deliberation, where patient and physician interact, share and finally make
the decision together. Both parties ought to accept moral responsibility to arrive at a
decision through interactive deliberation. The process of deliberation could transcend
both identities' narrative and limitation to conclude with a resolution on a transcended
higher level derived from perceived power dichotomy or dilemma. This solution is
more than just a consensus of the two positions.
One criticism against such a demanding model of deliberation could be to point out
patients' vulnerability and dependency on doctors and their medical care. Lelie
(2003) points out, however, that such dependency is an inherent part of all patient-
doctor interactions and emphasises the equal dependency of the doctor on the patient.
This reciprocal dependency should invoke " ... a [mutual] responsibility to see that the
patient's perspective is fulfilling its share in the deliberation."
According to this deliberative model, no doctor should unilaterally invoke a futility
judgement as a trump card against patient's autonomy. Instead, a patient's request for
ongoing life-sustaining treatment could serve as a "... starting point for further
exploration and deliberation." A futility judgement can never be a full justification to
implement a specific action, since it requires further explanation in terms of values,
perspectives and treatment goals. These futility judgements should therefore never
end a discussion, but rather serve as a starting point. The deliberative model
highlights the urgent need for a democratisation of medical institutions.
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A recent American study (SUPPORT Principal Investigators, 1995) found serious
deficiencies in the willingness of many physicians to talk to seriously ill patients and
their families about wishes for treatment at the end of life. This was a two-phase
prospective study aimed at improving end-of-life decision-making. Phase 1 consisted
of a two-year prospective observational study of 4301 patients, documenting the
degree of patient-physician communication, the frequency of aggressive treatment at
the end-of-life, and the characteristics of hospital death. Phase 2 consisted of a two-
year controlled trial of 4810 patients and their physicians, randomised to an
intervention group or a control group. Physicians in the intervention group received
daily estimates of six-month survival, outcomes of CPR, and the estimated functional
disability at six months. During phase 1, serious deficiencies in willingness to talk to
patients and their families were found among physicians. Furthermore, the
intervention protocol of phase 2 failed to improve communication or patient care.
Evidence such as presented in the above trial suggests that a lot of hard work, such as
research, medical training and implementation of policies, particularly in the area of
palliative care, is urgently needed, I would like to suggest that one potential source
for a solution to this problem may be gathered from the, generally under-regarded,
African point of view.
3.11. AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE20
The African purpose and idea of morality is that of human well-being within a
community. Relationships are crucial and are underlined by the absolute equality of
all human beings (Tangwa, 1996; Agyeman, 2000). The weak, the poor, the
deformed, and the physically handicapped are particularly respected because of a
belief that such persons usually possess extraordinary 'depth', have unusually
powerful personal spirit-gods, or are frequently used as disguises by the spirits or by
God. " ... Nso' morality [tribe in Cameroon] is ultimately and fundamentally human-
20 For a discussion if 'African Philosophy' exists and the troubled reflection of Western Philosophy
over it, see Ramose (2003).
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centred in so far as its teleological end and limits are defined by human well-being"
(Tangwa, 1996).
Well-being is so central to their outlook, that they prefer death to suffering. '''A si
ngeh bong kpu' means death is preferable to suffering" (Tangwa, 1996: 194). With
'fedee ne owuo a nee fanyinam owou' the Akans similarly express that they prefer
death " ... given humiliation or indignity versus death" (Agyeman, 2000: 204).
"A good death would be defined as a relatively painless one that is neither premature
nor overdue" (Tangwa, 1996: 195). At advanced age, Africans fear illness and
suffering, thus, they would object to sustaining life by artificial means. For a
terminally sick patient it would be morally acceptable" ... to seek and be helped to
find a gentle and painless release from meaningless pain and suffering" (Tangwa,
1996:197). It would however be morally unacceptable to terminate one's own life
(Agyeman, 2000; Tangwa, 1996).
Concluding his essay, Tangwa makes the following plea: "Africans have benefited
from western culture and used it to enrich their indigenous cultures. But,
unfortunately, in so doing, Africans have also neglected some vital aspects of their
own indigenous cultures which could, in tum, have helped to humanise and enrich
western culture. As there is no possibility of Africans imposing these putative
benefits of African culture on Westerners through any putative 'blackman's burden'
and 'decivilising mission', it is really up to westerners to salvage these elements of
African cultures for the enrichment of western culture and the benefit of humankind,
since western culture is, indisputably, the overwhelmingly dominant culture of our
historical epoch" (1996: 199). Such reciprocal cultural exchange could create a
narrative for those areas where dichotomy is in need of transcendence, as pointed out
by Lelie et al. (2003).
I am of the opinion that this possibility warrants further analysis and would suggest
such by, for example, reflecting on the concept of Ubuntu.
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Before I conclude the discussion of medical futility, I would just very briefly like to
present some futility policies, which have been developed mainly in the USA.
3.12. FUTILITY POLICIES
A few hospitals, particularly in the USA, saw a need to create and implement futility
policies as a means to manage the different contingent issues involved with medical
futility. The American Medical Association has suggested a four-step process In
implementing medical futility policies (American Medical Association, 1998).
1. Prior Deliberation of Values.
Sincere attempts should be made to deliberate and negotiate prior understandings
between patient, proxy and physician on what constitutes futile treatment, and what
falls within acceptable limits for the physician, family, and possibly the institution.
2. Joint decision-making using outcomes data and value judgments.
Joint decision-making should occur between patient or proxy and physician to the
maximum extent possible.
3. Involving Consultant[s].
If disagreements arise, attempts should be made to negotiate and reach a resolution
within all parties' acceptable limits, with the assistance of consultants if indicated.
4. Involvement of Ethics Committee.
If disagreements are irresolvable, an institutional committee such as the Ethics
Committee should become involved.
If the above process does not lead to a resolution of the conflict, a further two-step
process has been suggested. Firstly, it should be attempted to transfer patient care
within the same institution. Secondly, should this fail, a transfer to another institution
should be facilitated.
50
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
A strong philosophy of care seems to be driving many of these different hospital
futility policies. This is reflected in the following:
There is emphasis on comfort care throughout the conflict resolution process
and particularly, once the determination of medical futility has been accepted
by the patient, the family or the health care surrogate.
There is regard for the importance of asking what it is that the patient wishes to
do, and the health care team's awareness of these patient's objectives.
The role of educating people about treatment preferences among families prior
to the end of life is prominent.
There is encouragement of communicating what those treatment options may
be before the end of life.
The importance of immediate open communication between providers and
patients, families and health care surrogates, and
The need to respect cultural and religious differences is important.
These guidelines focus on a necessary open and continuous dialogue between the
health care team and the patient, family or surrogate. Here it becomes obvious that the
involved health care team must have the capacity and the training for opening and
maintaining the lines of communication at all times. It is essential that the health care
team is particularly sensitive to the patient's dignity, values, religion, and ethnic
morality (Moore, 1989).
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Chapter 4: CASE STUDIES
4.1. AVOIDANCE OF EMERGENCY SURGERY IN TRISOMY 18 WITH
LIFE-THREATENING ANOMALY?
A premature baby, weighing 1200g, was admitted to the Children's Hospital NICU
with a suspected diagnosis of trisomy 18 (Edward's Syndrome) and oesophageal
atresia with tracheo-oesophageal fistula.
The clinical literature suggests that ninety percent of infants with trisomy 18 will die
within 3 months of birth. All long-term survivors have had severe mental and growth
retardation (Bos et aI., 1992; Paris, Weiss, & Soifer, 1992). Oesophageal atresia is an
abnormality occurring in about 1:5000 live births. It is incompatible with survival if
untreated but the immediate threat to life is not from the atresia and inability to
swallow but from the potential respiratory complications. Many of these babies are of
low birth weight, usually small for dates and have in more than half of them other
associated anomalies. Aspiration of the blind upper pouch must be prevented but the
biggest danger is related to gastro-oesophageal reflux up the lower pouch through the
fistula into the trachea.
The operation of choice is a pnmary end-to-end anastomosis after ligation and
division of the tracheo-oesophageal fistula. This procedure should only be performed
where there is a specialist team of anaesthetists, paediatric surgeons and nurses, and
where there are specialist facilities for postoperative respiratory and nutritional
support. A review of the Kenyan practice presented at the 1994 PAPSA (Panafrican
Paediatric Surgical Association) conference revealed a 100% mortality (Brown, 2003,
personal communication). Within the context of a developed country, "[e]ssentially
only severe cardiac anomalies, devastating chromosomal abnormalities, and major
pulmonary complications significantly affect the eventual outcome" (Filston &
Shorter, 2000: 364).
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Survival has become the norm and reports look at functional results of survivors. The
decision to intervene and to repair the oesophageal atresia with tracheo-esophageal
fistula has to be decided on urgently. Karyotyping of lymphocytes to confirm the
suspected diagnosis of trisomy 18 could take however up to three days.
Pondering about the right moral attitude to adopt, when suspecting trisomy 18 in a
newborn with other life-threatening anomalies, a number of ethical questions arise.
Should the patient undergo aggressive and invasive treatment? Should rare resources
be used knowing that the patient's condition is ultimately fatal? Could the parents
demand life-sustaining treatment against the counsel of the treatment team?
Various treatment options could be regarded appropriate in such a situation. Firstly,
the medical team could decide to repair the oesophageal defect or create a feeding
gastrostomy with or without repairing the fistula. The argument justifying this
decision would be to facilitate home care and natural feeding. This decision is
supported by the argument that an oesophageal atresia repair is standard paediatric
surgical practise with generally good outcome.
The question, which needs careful consideration, is what should be done if
anaesthetic or surgical complications should develop intra- or post-operatively? Intra-
operative ventilation could become extremely difficult, requiring CPR. Since an intra-
operative death is a non-natural death with legal implications, most medical teams
would typically attempt CPR. How long should post-operative ventilation be offered?
If a major disruption of the oesophageal repair, having a high morbidity and
mortality, becomes apparent post-operatively, would the surgical team have the
obligation to re-operate to correct the complication? If the baby develops pneumonia,
are antibiotics indicated? Should total parenteral nutrition be added, if the baby
cannot feed within days? What ought to be done if the NICU bed is required for
another baby with a better prognosis? Do we have to debate all these questions with
the parents and include the conclusions on the consent form, for example that the
baby will not be ventilated post-operatively?
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Many have argued that it is pointless to treat a baby with such a hopeless prognosis.
Ramsey (1970: 133-134) wrote, "[w]hen death is inevitable, further aggressive
interventions cease to be treatments and become a painful abuse of the patient." Who
however decides when death is inevitable and what is the value of being alive for a
few days, weeks or months?
Moore (1989) provides a partial answer to the above questions when he writes,
"[m]edicine must offer the patient more than pain, suffering and costs." He finds it
therefore wrong to attempt" ... desperate measures for desperate patients [or parents]
desperately hopeless from the outset." What is called for is not a technological answer
for a physiological challenge and thereby prolonging the process of dying but a
conscious shift to comfort care and palliation. Many physicians struggle with this
very paradigm shift from curative to palliative care.
In the past decade medical, ethical, and legal commentators have sorted through the
various 'Baby Doe' proposals (Which Baby Shall Live, 1985; Euthanasia And The
Newborn, 1987). It seems that a consensus is emerging on what the 'best interests' of
the child involve, namely that one needs to reject the insistence of maximal life-
sustaining interventions for every infant regardless of diagnosis or prognosis. The
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioural Research (1983) argued that there are times when the
patient's condition is such that further life-sustaining medical interventions may be
foregone.
Finally letting such patients die may not be executing our ethical conviction. Perhaps
we ought to help them to die by shortening their suffering. A strong correlation has
been suggested between improved coping of families and euthanasia of a significant
relative, compared to natural death of the latter. A recent research study from the
Netherlands (Swarte et aI., 2003) assessed 189 bereaved family members and close
friends of terminally ill cancer patients who died by euthanasia, and 316 bereaved
family members and close friends of comparable cancer patients who died a natural
death between 1992 and 1999. The family and friends of cancer patients who died by
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euthanasia presented with fewer traumatic grief symptoms, fewer current feelings of
grief and fewer post-traumatic stress reactions than the family and friends of cancer
patients who died of natural causes. These differences were independent of other risk
factors.
The authors state that their results "... should not be interpreted as a plea for
euthanasia, but as a plea for the same level of care and openness in all patients who
are terminally ill. This is a crucial point that needs further exploration.
4.2. A CASE OF ACTIVE EUTHANASIA FOR SHORT BOWEL
SYNDROME
THE NO HOPE / NO CHANCE SITUATION
"Treatment is delaying death; it is not improving life quality or potential. There is no
legal obligation Jar a doctor to provide any medical treatment if it is not in the best
interests oj the patient. Indeed. If this is done knowingly (futile treatment) it may
constitute an assault."
Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health
"We have, in fact, two kinds of morality side by side: one, which we preach but do
not practice, and another which we practice but seldom preach."
Bertrand Russell
Jacob21 was born at 37/40 weeks gestation as the first child to a young religious
couple. Shortly after birth, with the first attempts at breastfeeding, it became evident
that there was a serious problem. He could not keep his milk down and progressively
vomited milk mixed with bile. He was born prematurely, with a birth-weight of 2,5
21 The name of the patient has been changed to keep confidentiality
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kg. Physical examination did not reveal any major abnormality. The abdominal x-ray
findings showed a double bubble sign that is paradigmatic for intestinal obstruction at
the level of the duodenum.
At surgery, multiple small bowel atresias (5 atresias in total = type IV)22 were found
within the first 6 cm of the small bowel. The critical finding was that after the surgery
he was left with a total of 12 cm small bowel (including the duodenum). He had an
intact ileo-caecal valve and a normal colon.
Short bowel syndrome (SBS) is a condition, defined by the length or absorptive
function of the small bowel, e.g. a residual length of the distal small bowel (jejunum
and/or ileum) of less than 75 cm, without including the duodenum or colon.
"Although many factors influence survival, long-term survival is possible in infants
with an 11-15 cm jejuno-ileum and an intact ileo-caecal valve or 25-40 cm small
bowel length without an ileo-caecal valve" (Millar, Rode, & Cywes, 2000: 419). It is
important to realize that these are overseas data!
The surgeon's immediate reaction was that Jacob did not have enough small bowel
length to become independent from artificial feeding. A discussion developed in the
operating theatre. The main question was, if one should repair the defect or should
leave it alone in consideration of the poor and futile outcome. Further consultation
was engaged with the head of the academic Paediatric Surgical Department. On his
advice, the defects were corrected and Jacob referred to the University Children's
Hospital for post-operative management.
He recovered uneventfully and was given total parenteral nutrition (TPN:
intravenous, artificial feeding). An ad hoc Ethics Committee with involvement of
various role-players (different paediatric medical and nursing staff) was convened. It
was decided to give him a treatment trial of 3 months, during and after which his
condition would be reviewed. According to the prognostic factors (Sonderheimer et
aI., 1998) applied at 3 months of age, there was sufficient indication at that time that
22Atresia is the medical term for a medical condition where the bowel has a complete mechanical
obstruction. Atresias are classified into five different types, whereby type IV means multiple atresias.
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he would be able to sustain his life. His treatment was continued and today Jacob is a
healthy boy and has an excellent quality of life. The burden of his condition and the
constant absence of the mother, who was most of the time in the hospital with her
child, might have lead to the divorce of the parents.
Petrus23 was admitted for investigations of biliary atresia to another academic
hospital. He was 2 months old and deeply jaundiced. While he was waiting for his
blood results, he had an acute event, whereby he started to vomit profusely intestinal
contents and developed a serious abdominal condition. His abdominal operation
confirmed the preliminary diagnosis of biliary atresia, which is a very serious
condition where the extra-hepatic bile ducts are involved in an inflammatory process
and progressively vanish, leaving the liver congested and prone to fibrosis and
progressive cirrhosis. At the same time, he had a midgut volvulus (twist in the
mesentery of the small bowel, interrupting the blood supply to the midgut) with most
of the midgut being severely compromised and at least 80% being dead and non-
viable.
For the purpose of giving the infant a real chance of recovery, the twisted mesentery
was untwisted, a liver biopsy for confirmation of biliary atresia taken and the
abdomen closed. Postoperatively he was sent back to the ICU for further active
management with the plan to reassess the possible recovery of the small bowel at a
re-look operation 48 hours later. Counselling the parents and extended family, they
were given information about the two conditions, after which a discussion about the
potential for a composite (liver and small bowel) transplant ensued. The liver-
transplant team who were asked for their expert advice, declined to take over
potential further treatment.
At the second operation, it was found that his small bowel had not recovered, but
instead actually had deteriorated even further. Theoretically, his only chance of
survival would have been a liver and small bowel transplant, which at the present
moment is unavailable in South Africa but seems to have evolved according to
23 Again not his real name.
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Kosmach (2003) " ... from an experimental strategy to a feasible alternative ... " with
a long term survival rate of just over 50%.
The parents, together with the extended family, were counselled and given ample
time to deliberate amongst themselves. Finally, they reached the conclusion that the
baby should be extubated once the whole family has left the hospital. The explanation
for this request was that it would have been an unacceptable cultural practice for the
mother to stay behind and hold her child in her arms for purposes of comfort care
after the extubation. According to their belief this would have brought bad luck onto
the mother and through her onto the father. This cultural belief is related to pollution
beliefs around death and has implications for her relationship to her husband
afterwards.
The baby was extubated, but survived for another three long and distressing weeks,
causing consternation and doubts about the clinical assessment and the approach
followed. TPN was withdrawn, but the intravenous fluids that were the likely reason
that the infant survived such a substantial amount of time, were continued.
A review of the local experience with the short bowel syndrome (unpublished data)
revealed that in the last 25 years there was not a single survivor locally with a small
bowel length of less than 20 em. Fifty-six medical records of children with short
bowel syndrome were analysed (1979-1993). There were 39 survivors and 17 deaths.
The 39 survivors received a mean of 137 days (range 7-694 days) TPN. Seven
children out of the 17 non-survivors did not receive any treatment. Their mean length
of small bowel was 11 cm (range of 7-17 cm). The incidence of mortality differed
according to the length of small bowel. A small bowel length of more than 50 cm had
a 12% mortality (4/34); a length of 30-50 cm had a 35% mortality (4/11) and a length
less than 30 cm 82% mortality (9111). Two patients from the last mentioned group
received more than 2 years of TPN before they died.
Jacob had two favourable prognostic factors, his prematurity and the presence of an
ileo-caecal valve (point of transition from small bowel to large bowel). It is thought
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that foetal small bowel can still double in size in the last trimester, " ... from the mean
115 cm at 19 to 27 gestational weeks to 248 cm at 35 to 40 weeks" (Millar et aI.,
2000: 419). The loss of the ileo-caecal valve however, doubles the mortality (50%/
21%).
Because long-term adaptation to neonatal small intestinal resection appears to depend
directly on elongation of the bowel, which is accompanied by increased linear
growth, it is self-evident that the patient with the shortest residual bowel will require
parenteral nutritional support for the longest time. It seems that other factors have an
impact on the success of neonates gaining nutritional independence. Accurate
prediction of the duration of nutritional dependence solely based on the residual
length of small bowel has been for this reason inaccurate.
Sonderheimer et al. (1998) confirm that the small bowel has a capacity to adapt until
40 months. Their study showed that after that time they did not have a single patient
who could become TPN independent. Therefore, traditionally the infant would have
been given a trial of over 2 years till it becomes clear that further bowel adaptation
would be highly unlikely and nutritional independence an impossibility. The infant's
tolerance for enteral feeding, as a proportion of the total daily energy intake, was a
significant predictor of duration of dependence on TPN. Their paper allows prediction
of expected durations of TPN for patients with any combination of the two significant
variables of length of small bowel and percentage of daily enteral energy intake at 12
weeks' adjusted age.
The clinical situation is further complicated by the fact that treatment itself, such as
TPN, could have severe complications. Most commonly encountered problems are
recurrent central line infections, cholestasis that may progress to liver fibrosis,
cirrhosis and liver failure.
Petrus' situation on the other hand is quite different. He had nothing in his favour,
since he was already 2 months old and there would have been no chance that any
recovering bowel would have lengthened in time. The second serious condition of
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biliary atresia was an additional limiting factor for any chance at a normal life. Biliary
atresia is a progressive disease. Many of these infants have definite excretion of bile
at birth, but develop jaundice due to a progressive inflammatory condition that leads
to a complete biliary obstruction. Once the diagnosis is confirmed, a porto-
enterostomy, a so-called Kasai24 procedure, can be performed. In simple terms, this
procedure makes it possible that the obstructed intra-hepatic bile ducts drain into the
small bowel.
Initially, about fifty percent of infants will have a good response, going on to ages 4
or 5 years with good bile flow. Thereafter however, the ongoing progression of liver
fibrosis will lead to cirrhosis and complications from portal hypertension, such as
bleeding episodes from oesophageal varices that finally necessitates a liver
transplantation. Ultimately less than 20% of those who have had a porto-enterostomy
will survive to adulthood without the need for a liver transplant.
There is some debate regarding the utility of a primary porto-enterostomy compared
to a primary liver transplantation. Many paediatric surgeons in the developed world
and all working within the framework of a developing country accept that if a child is
seen early, probably before the age of 3-4 months, it is advisable to start with a porto-
. enterostomy to keep and reserve the liver transplant for those who fail after porto-
enterostomy or present late (Sigalet, 2000).
The traditional task of physicians is nonmaleficence and beneficence towards their
patients. This is generally achieved by respecting patient or patient-proxy autonomy.
Where this would not be possible, physicians would maximize patient's best interests.
Petrus' treatment could be considered futile and had the potential to even be harmful.
There was no local medical option to save his life, therefore TPN, which is a balanced
nutrition necessary for his growth and development, had been correctly withdrawn.
The continuation of intravenous hydration, containing the necessary water,
electrolytes and glucose for his maintenance, could sustain his life, at least for a short
24 So called after the procedure's inventor.
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period. Such management however seems confused. Futile treatment is withdrawn
half-heartedly, and by continuing intravenous fluids, the suffering of the infant, his
parents and, equally important, of all the medical staff involved was directly
prolonged.
These state of affairs show a deep seated conflict, which the American Association of
Paediatrics Committee on Bioethics eloquently expressed, when they wrote that
"[a]lthough many health care professionals feel reluctant to discontinue life-
sustaining treatments, most philosophical and legal commentators find no important
ethical or legal distinction between not instituting a treatment and discontinuing
treatment already initiated .... Continuing non-beneficial treatment harms many
patients and may constitute a legal, as well a moral, wrong" (Kohrman, 1994).
Continuing with non-beneficial intravenous fluids thus seems futile. The fluid
treatment is not sustaining the patient until a curative treatment becomes available,
nor is it treating the disease process itself. His terminal condition is artificially
prolonged without hope of improvement. To keep somebody forcefully and
hopelessly alive could be considered an assault as well as an abuse of professional
authority. There is no evidence that intravenous fluids lessen the infant's discomfort
of hunger and thirst; instead, one could argue that they rather extend the infant's
experience of discomfort.
There could be a strong argument that terminal sedation (Quill & Byock, 2000; Quill,
Dresser, & Brock, 1997) or even active euthanasia would have been a more
appropriate option. "Terminal sedation is the use of high doses of sedatives to relieve
extremes of physical distress. It is not restricted to end-of-life care and is sometimes
used as a temporising measure in trauma, bum, post-surgical, and intensive care.
Although rendering a patient unconscious to escape suffering is an extraordinary
measure, withholding such treatment in certain circumstances would be inhumane .
. . .. When applied to patients who have no ... prospect of recovery, terminal sedation
refers to a similar last-resort response to extreme, unrelieved physical suffering. The
purpose of the medications is to render the patient unconscious to relieve suffering,
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not to intentionally end ... her life. . ... In the context of far-advanced disease and
expected death, artificial nutrition, hydration, antibiotics, mechanical ventilation, and
other life-prolonging interventions are not instituted and usually withdrawn if they are
already in place" (Quill & Byock, 2000). Before such treatment can be applied, it is
vital to have the parents' informed consent and to be in no doubt about the presence
of final, severe and intractable suffering.
A counterargument could be that the intravenous fluid was continued with the
beneficial aim to ease the parents' emotional pain about their child's terminal
prognosis. It might have been an effort not to be too harsh with them by withdrawing
all therapeutic interventions at the same time. Such an attempt, as compassionate as
its underlying motivation might be, could actually be considered to be dishonest. It
gives a false message to parents who might think that the baby is still being treated
and that there is hope. It is important to be aware that the primary responsibility
remains towards the infant's best interest and only secondarily to care for the parents
and other significant others.
On further analysis, it becomes clear that there was a beneficial paternalism at work, a
paternalism that is prevalent in the African context as discussed. It is unlikely that the
parents were informed about different therapeutic options and that the intravenous
fluids were potentially responsible for the protracted dying process of their baby. In a
way, their autonomy was not respected. Honest and open self-reflection ought to
protect from naïve beneficial paternalism becoming abuse of expert authority.
The debate around the acceptability of withdrawing! foregoing nutritional treatment at
the end-of-life is ongoing. Nearly half of the respondents to a survey of doctors and
nurses expressed concern about the acceptability of withdrawing! forgoing such
treatments (Solomon, O'Donnell, & Jennings, 1993). There is a powerful symbolism
in feeding the hungry and giving drink to the thirsty. Feeding the hungry has been
cited as the most fundamental of all human relationships and " ... the perfect symbol
of the fact that human life is inescapably social and communal" (Callahan, 1983).
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Moreover, "feeding is the first response of the community to the needs of newborns
and remains a central mode of nurture and comfort" (Lynn & Childress, 1983).
Food and water are, in other words, powerful symbols of care and comfort, and
through their provision we communicate our compassion and concern for one
another. There is therefore a concern that withholding or withdrawing artificial
nutrition and hydration will undermine our commitment to the values of care and
comfort, both in medical institutions and in society at large.
The focus on the symbolic value of providing food and water may mask several
important differences. Artificial nutrition and hydration are provided with the intent
to prevent or treat malnutrition and dehydration. Conversely, hunger and thirst can
sometimes be treated without resorting to artificial nutrition and hydration.
Moistening the patient's lips and mouth with ice chips or glycerine swabs can
alleviate the sensation of thirst associated with a dry mouth.
In addition, artificial nutrition and hydration require invasive procedures that strain
the symbolism of offering food and drink to those in need. They are supplied through
the patient's nose and throat (nasogastric tube), veins (intra-venous line), stomach
(gastrostomy), intestine (jejunostomy), or major vessel into the heart
(hyperalimentation). All these procedures come at a price that the patient would have
to pay by enduring increased suffering induced by the treatment complications.
Finally, rather than undermining the values of care and comfort, withholding or
withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration may actually contribute to the dying
patient's sense of comfort. In short, withholding or withdrawing artificial nutrition
and hydration should not automatically be equated with "starving the patient to
death", and is even considered by some to be a form of compassionate treatment
(McCann, Hall, & Groth-Junkcer, 1994; Printz, 1992). It can be concluded then that
to stop food and water intake is part of the dying process.
Another debate is whether artificial nutrition and hydration are morally similar to, or
should be distinguished from, interventions recognized as medical treatments. Those
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who argue that artificial nutrition and hydration should always be provided may
contend that they are forms of basic supportive or palliative care, rather than medical
treatments aimed at curing a disease (Rosner, 1993). Others claim that artificial
nutrition and hydration are not relevantly different from other medical treatments.
They are invasive, prescribed by physicians, and administered by health care
professionals and should therefore be governed by the same standards (MacFie,
1996).
Withholding or withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration seems to blur the
distinction between killing and allowing to die. Withholding or withdrawing artificial
nutrition and hydration might seem not merely to allow the patient to die, but to kill
the patient, and therefore be morally suspect. This aspect of the debate is worthy of
further research in order to critically analyze the logic of the difference between
killing and letting die (active/ passive euthanasia) (Kuhse, 1998; Rachels, 1975). It is
an enigma to me, to understand how an extubation, while the patient is still under the
influence of muscle paralytic agents, could be regarded passive euthanasia and is
generally accepted, while injecting a deadly drug to speed up the undeniable dying
process is usually regarded as active and prosecutable euthanasia.
Another point worthy of consideration, is that such futile treatment often ruins the
family financially. leU treatment is very expensive and in private practise, medical
aid can easily run out of funds. If the patient is continued to be treated at the private
institution, the family can face ruin and personal disaster.
Finally, even though there is great uncertainty about the baby's expenence, we
nevertheless need to ask ourselves if there is any value to drawing out such hopeless
suffering, and whether such hopeless suffering could not be labelled futile. What
seems important though, is the acknowledgment of there being a time when a
paradigm of cure and healing is appropriate. Such a situation may however change to
one which demands a shift to a paradigm of comfort care. Medical professionals are
ill equipped and trained for such a shift and they find it difficult to do.
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Chapter 5: CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this study has attempted to demonstrate the importance of the concept
of medical futility within the broader field of end-of-life decision-making. The
exponential growth in medical technology and skill pertaining to medical science
generally, and in the NICU particularly, brings with it a growing body of moral
dilemmas. Amongst other consequences, these changes have brought about a
significant drop in perinatal mortality. New and rapid technological changes, e.g.
CPR25, have created pressures for a need to re-examine underlying tacit assumptions
of established medical practice (Health Care Ethics Committee of the Health Council
of South Florida, 2000; Zweibel, 1989).26 An example of such assumption is the
utopian ideology that physicians are fighting death and disease with science lighting
the way to a better health for all (Hodgkin, 1996).
Such a situation presents the danger of applying emergent technology uncritically in
order to prolong life (or the process of dying). This may be done without restraint,
without prior careful and critical considerations of patient factors. One example of
such uncritical application is where patients with medically futile conditions are
subjected to the uncritical application of technologically advanced interventions,
without careful consideration of the induced suffering to the patient and her family, as
well as to the health professionals involved. In the extreme, it can become a matter of
science for the sake of science, losing sight of other significant aspects of patient care.
It cannot be denied that there are situations where treatment will be ineffective in
ameliorating or correcting the underlying condition. The factors most frequently cited
by decision-making physicians, are poor prognosis and quality of life. The Royal
College of Paediatrics and Child Health published a document in 1997 regarding the
2S The advent of CPR, ICU, ventilator support and TPN have changed the nature of clinical medicine
practiced and force us to critically reflect the technology applied. The progress of medical practice is
forcing us to make difficult decisions of end-of-life and resource allocation.
26 e.g. the interest in transplantation contributed to an interest in brain-oriented definitions of death,
which haven't as yet been universally accepted For a further and detailed reading consult Grodin, MA
1993. Religious advance directives: the convergence of law, religion, medicine and public health.
American Journal of Public Health 83: 899-903; Paris, JJ, Bell, AL and Murphy, JJ. 1995. Pediatric
brain death: dead is dead. Journal of Perina tology 15: 67-70.
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practice of withholding or withdrawing life sustaining treatment in children. Four
points seem relevant to our current discussion:
a) There is no ethical difference between withdrawing and withholding
treatment.
b) There is no obligation to give treatment, which is considered futile and
burdensome - indeed this could be regarded as an assault on the child.
c) Treatment goals may be changed in the case of children who are dying.
d) Treatment may be withdrawn if continuation is not in the patient's best
interest.
The same document lists five situations where curative treatment may be withheld or
withdrawn:
1. The Brain Dead Child.
2. The permanent Vegetative State.
3. The' No Chance' situation (delaying death).
4. The 'No Purpose' situation (physical and mental disability too great to
be acceptable).
5. The 'unbearable' situation (burden to high for quality of life).
Compassionate withdrawal of treatment would require movmg from a tactical
approach and its associated goal, where the physician focuses on individual
interventions, to a strategic approach, where a different overall treatment goal needs
to be formulated. The formulation of this treatment goal should be the result of
continuous discussions with the parents and the staff. The desired treatment goals and
not the availability of technology or the futility of treatment, should dictate the plan
of care. This treatment goal should not be taken as an absolute, but rather as a
guideline; like a light in a dark room that allows the individual objects to be seen
clearly and in the fullness of their context.
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Rapid technological progress changes cultural contexts and social structures, which is
often overlooked. The western medical paradigm needs to be replaced with a more
pluralistic, postmodern, contextual appropriate one, within which healthcare can be
delivered. It can no longer be presupposed that physicians, nurses and patients share a
common view of the good of life nor that medical practice will be conducted, framed
by the Judeo-Christian principlea"
This study has indicated that the dominance of patient autonorny" has been
increasingly challenged and that the concept of medical futility has been central to
such a challenge. There is a growing body of evidence suggesting that it is " ...
consistent with the goals of medicine since the time of Hippocrates [that] physicians
not only have no obligation to treat - or even present such options to patients and
families - when medical interventions cannot produce a sufficient quality of life,
[such as restoring consciousness and the ability to live without continuous life
support] but also that physicians cease behaving professionally if they persist even
when no medically valid goal remains" (Capron, 1997).
Advocates of patients' rights fear, however, that the application of medical futility
could be used as a trump card by the medical profession for expert domination and
paternalism over and against patient autonomy and self-determination.
I suggest that a timely paradigm shift is necessary within the growing awareness of
the actual limits of medical science's propensity to cure, heal and extend life. A
consequence of uncritical acceptance of the advanced possibilities that technology
presents to medicine may lead to the fallacy being supported that cure is effected by
prolonging life. What may actually often occur instead is that the dying process is
prolonged. Such a process may not only prolong suffering, but also actually cause it.
Due to the complexity of moral and psychological issues, inevitably involved in such
27 There is a lack of information about African patient's values. An inquiry at the Medical
Anthropology Department (University of Cape Town) demonstrated an aporia of knowledge. It can
therefore only be concluded that the western scientific paradigm is uncritically accepted when modern
clinical medicine is practiced within the South African context. lts applicability within the South
African context of multiculturalism has not been analysed to my knowledge.
28 Again, the place of patient autonomy within an African setting is unknown.
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situations, all persons involved in the process may suffer. Furthermore, caring based
on empathy and sympathy (meaning suffering together), is sacrificed for treatment
based on technological imperatives.
It has been argued that technological advances in medicine have obscured the need
for human compassion for the dying and their loved ones. There is a growing public
demand for a more holistic, integrated approach towards health, illness, death and
dying. Furthermore, published literature reports evidence that the quality of end-of-
life care is often unsatisfactory for both patients and families (Singer & Bowman,
2002).
It is within this context that the concept of medical futility is positioned, even though
it sometimes seems to have a pejorative connotatiorr" and suffers from ambiguities. I
am of the opinion that the concept of medical futility should serve as a catalyst for an
open and critical debate amongst all the relevant parties involved in end-of-life
decision-making.
As the process of decision-making has always been and remains an essential part of
any medical practice, medical personnel do not have the luxury of naively
withdrawing from such responsibility. What is required is greater awareness of ethical
decision-making, models of communication, conflict-resolution, history taking and
assessment of patient values and preferences, as well as training and enabling a
capacity to care (empathy) (Goold, Williams, & Robert, 2000; Singer& Bowman,
2002).
In conclusion, five core elements as suggested by Brody (1997) seem to summarize
this discussion of medical futility as it relates to end-of-life decision-making:
1. It is important to understand the difference between the futility/ integrity debate
and the justice debate. Treatment of little benefit could possibly be considered
once it has become cheaper. However, treatment, which violates the patient's or
29 Like other terms which are often used in medical language, such as hysterical or hypochondriac.
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physician's integrity should never be provided independent of how cheap it
might be.
2. Debating medical futility should not be equated to debating patient autonomy.
3. A deliberative model of medical futility is essential to defuse the major
underlying reservations that the concept of futility could be used as a trump
card for unilateral withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.
4. Responsibility and care for patient well-being must outweigh the potential
abuse of futility determinations by physician authority.
5. Patients should at all times have the right to a second opinion and access to an
open review procedure by an ethical committee.
In spite of the concept of futility having a pejorative connotation, I have attempted to
indicate that avoiding the concept altogether is detrimental to the debate concerning
end-of-life decision-making. Medical futility could serve as a useful starting point for
deliberation of all issues related to such a discussion and could contribute to an
evolving patient-physician relationship that could transcend to a higher level of true
communication and where novel solutions may be found. Such solutions would have
a greater chance of being ethically sound, if all parties involved, such as the patient
and his family, the caregiver, and all support involved, could critically and
objectively deliberate the dilemmas.
The difficult shift from a paradigm of cure to one of care indicates that there is a need
for research and education in quality of end-of-life care. It is ironic therefore, that
only very few papers have addressed quality of life care in developing countries.
"This is perhaps nothing more than another manifestation of the 90/1 0 gap - that 90%
of medical research is undertaken on those diseases that cause 10% of the global
burden of disease" (Singer & Bowman, 2002).
Finally, I hope that the powers in charge of medical training, hospital management
and resource allocation will demonstrate their leadership by implementing a
framework that is conducive for the ongoing progress of clinical medicine as well as
the evolution of our consciousness that should lead to an overall compassion. An
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indication of this deeper awareness of the moral intricacies that the practice of
modem clinical medicine brings with it, and that this demands answers to very
difficult ethical questions, is reflected in the written question that was asked at the
recent Certificate Examination in Paediatric Surgery of the College of Surgeons
(2003): "[d]escribe your understanding of the concept of "futile care" as it pertains to
paediatric surgical practice a) [u]nder what circumstances would you consider it
appropriate to withdraw active treatment to a critically ill child? b) What do you
consider to be essential basic care? [and] c)[w]hat are the medicolegal implications of
withdrawal of care in the South African context?
I conclude that the physician practicing good medicine realizes when the limit of
technology has been reached, when further attempts to save life are futile. It demands
the realization that there comes a time for the physician's role to change from trying
to save or prolong life, to trying to provide the best possible quality of life and care
for the patient in his remaining time. This should by no means be looked upon as
abandoning the patient, but rather as giving the patient and the family an opportunity
to come to terms with, and be at ease with the dying process. It is the responsibility of
the treating physician to guide this process by demonstrated sensitivity and
compassion, in addition to medical skills, when accompanying all parties involved
through to the final stage of end-of-life decision-making.
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FIGURES:
Figure 1 shows the cost-benefit relation, where declining treatment efficacy is
coupled with increased cost (financial as well personal) and shows how such
treatment can become a burden (marginal utility). This marginal utility forces
society to apply stringent criteria for resource allocation. Medical
professionals are directly exposed to these convergent societal demands.
Patients expect high standards and innovative medical therapy on the one
hand, yet on the other, socio-political forces demand sensible and rational use
of the limited resources. This creates tension and can potentially clash with
patient autonomy.
Figure 1. Marginal Utility adapted from Avery (1998).
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Figure 2. The tensions of moral principles considering withdrawing or
withholding life-sustaining treatment adapted from Avery (1998).
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